To take the pulse of any given international meeting, you do not measure all the cheerleading speeches made in the event hall at face value, you talk to attendees in the corridors and during coffee breaks.

The February 4-5 B5+1 forum in Bishkek was no exception. Underpinning all the positive talk about taking bilateral trade relations to the next level was a sense of urgency among many Central Asians. The chief source of worry is China, the economic dragon not in the room, but hovering over the Bishkek proceedings. In hushed hallway conversations, participants spoke about a need for the US to do more to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.

The two buzz phrases often heard on the sidelines of the B5+1 were “resource sovereignty” and “critical minerals.” Both governmental participants and entrepreneurs in Central Asia have high hopes that the Trump administration is serious about implementing a “deals, not declarations” strategy. At present, the bulk of Central Asia’s critical minerals exports go to China and Russia, with the United States importing only a tiny percentage, mainly uranium. But some Central Asia governmental sources expressed a desire to invert the export ratio within the next five years so that the United States is the recipient of the largest share of the region’s mineral wealth.

A Central Asian expert, granted anonymity given the sensitive nature of the topic, highlighted several factors that can help make this happen. One is the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), to which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are signatories. The partnership aims to “catalyze public and private investment in responsible critical minerals supply chains globally,” according to the US State Department. MSP is set up to pool demand among Western critical minerals consumers and encourage long-term relationships. That, in turn, creates revenue certainty, which is important for securing development financing.

A second factor is the provisional Armenian-Azerbaijani peace deal signed last August. That pact creates a realistic export route for bulked-up, westward-bound critical minerals exports via the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). 

Perhaps most importantly, Central Asian experts and leaders genuinely believe the US talk about win-win deals, as opposed to China or Russia, which both take a mercantile approach to trade and see Central Asia merely as a raw materials supplier.

Several participants at the B5+1 said regional officials tend to have a higher comfort level with the way the United States does business, as opposed to China, especially in the sphere of “de-risking” projects. The US relies on two institutions – the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) – to help American corporations overcome investment jitters. In particular, DFC offers insurance to guard against such business hazards as expropriation and political volatility.

Meanwhile, Chinese state capitalism often works through state-owned enterprises and debt-trap-style lending practices. In many cases, Chinese loans necessitate regional governmental guarantees, which heighten the risk of increasing the public debt.

Chinese practice also leans heavily on “infrastructure-for-resources” swap arrangements, and maintains tight control over processing, giving Beijing lots of leverage to squeeze Central Asian states on the prices paid for critical minerals. Plainly stated, from the perspective of many Central Asian officials, there is less financial risk and higher potential returns involved in dealing with US companies compared to Chinese entities, a few B5+1 participants said.

There are some win-win opportunities out there right now for the budding US-Central Asian strategic resources partnership. The Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) in the northern Kazakh city of Ust-Kamenogorsk is one such case. UMP is one of the few full-cycle processing facilities in the world for rare metals and the production of nuclear fuel pellets. It is also a key source for beryllium and tantalum, two elements widely used in the defence sector. 

UMP has supplied both Chinese and Western buyers. But the United States now seems interested in striking an exclusive long-term arrangement with UMP that, if it gets to the finish line, would effectively shut out Chinese buyers. A US-UMP deal would have particular significance for the aerospace industry. Companies, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, depend on beryllium and tantalum, which are used in guidance systems, avionics capacitors and fire-control systems.

Lots of attention at the B5+1 was focused on a groundbreaking tungsten deal, under which an American entity, Cove Kaz Capital, will develop two major deposits. China currently controls about 80% of the tungsten market globally, and a Chinese firm bid aggressively for the development rights to the two deposits, according to a Kazakh source. What enabled Cove Kaz Capital to outmanoeuvre the competition came down to two things: one was DFC financial support for the bid, which enabled Cove Kaz Capital to match the Chinese offer; and, more importantly, a commitment by the American entity to build up processing capacity in Kazakhstan.

Central Asian states are interested in developing value-added capabilities, and not just supplying the raw materials, as the Chinese prefer. If all goes well, the tungsten deposits will have a lifespan of up to 40 years, providing a reliable source of a critical mineral needed in all kinds of armaments.

Some Central Asians describe the value-added element of trade, in particular the practice of locating processing to the countries where the raw materials are found, as “friend shoring.” For countries in the region, friend-shoring has a clear value proposition that gives the United States a leg up on the Chinese; it eases entry into reliable Western supply chains, widens access to advanced technologies and maximises profits. 

Ultimately, the United States is comfortable with Central Asia’s desire for “resource sovereignty,” whereas China has trouble shaking its mercantilist mind-set. The Kazakh expert, who is familiar with government thinking, said officials in Astana believe the United States and European Union are willing to pay a premium for Kazakh tungsten, uranium and other critical minerals and rare earth elements (REEs), seeing this markup as an insurance policy against potential trade blackmail by Beijing. “By offering technology transfers, transparent financing, and integration into … value chains, Washington is building an ecosystem resilient to economic blackmail from strategic competitors,” the expert stated.

Central Asian officials and experts see the US position on critical minerals as a tremendous opportunity for them to strengthen their respective countries’ sovereignty and promote general prosperity, a true win-win. They are desperately hoping the Trump administration does not get distracted and stays the “deals-not-declarations” course.

This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.

Justin Burke is Eurasianet's publisher.