Just days before Iran claimed to have hit one of the US Air Force's most formidable jets - an F-35 stealth fighter - a Chinese social media account published a detailed guide on how such an attack could be carried out.

The video, posted in mid-March by an account called Laohu Talks World – laohu being Chinese for tiger with the first character ‘lao’ (老) also the first character used in the Chinese word for teacher – laoshi (老师), showed how Tehran could use run of the mill Iranian air defence systems to track and target America’s most advanced fighter jet.

The video in question quickly went viral, in the process attracting tens of millions of views. Then just days later, on March 19, Iran said its air defences, long-deemed backward by Western standards given its mix of older Soviet-era and domestically developed systems – had engaged an F-35A during an early morning mission over central Iran. In doing so, Iranian officials claimed to have forced the aircraft to make an emergency landing. The timing of the Iranian success against an F-35 prompted an immediate response from Chinese netizens with some describing it as strikingly prescient.

Since the start of Operation Epic Fury, a growing number of Chinese online accounts with science, technology, engineering, and mathematical backgrounds have been posting wide-ranging military analysis on how Iran can and should counter US air capabilities. These posts, which include in-depth technical explanations and tactical advice, are shared without subscription fees or obvious official support. However, given China’s use of its so-called civilian fishing fleets in the East China Sea to stretch Taiwanese and Japanese defence capabilities over the past five years, that such a form of decentralised knowledge-sharing during wartime should have no official backing is suspect at best.

The F-35 tutorial’s central argument, that forces in Iran could use low-cost systems against a fifth-generation stealth fighter, has at least a degree of technical credibility, however.

The F-35 Lightning II was designed to evade radar using its shape coupled to specialised production materials and hidden weapons bays. But stealth capabilities alone do not make the aircraft invisible, and its limitations are well known and recorded. Electro-optical and infrared sensors, which operate passively, do not trigger radar warning systems, and while the F-35 carries its own infrared sensor capabilities, it may not react fast enough to counter close-range threats. In the days after the March 19 incident it was noted that what happened was likely a passive EO/IR intercept. This in turn suggests the aircraft and pilot likely received no radar warning before the aircraft was damaged.

Analysts have since suggested that using a sudden radar burst against fifth-generation fighters to allow immediate tracking and firing of air defences, particularly once the aircraft has passed overhead, is easier than as it approaches; the long-standing reality being that attacking aircraft from behind is more successful than from any other angle. Whether or not the Chinese PLA Air Force is somehow involved, though, remains questionable. Officially China has kept its distance from the conflict, though reports point to Beijing having at least sold offensive drones and components to Iran in the months before the strikes began.

As such, what makes these civilian tutorials different is their public, unpaid, and supposedly unofficial nature and it remains unclear whether or not Beijing views this grassroots support as a problem, or is in some way behind it.