The defeat of Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia's October 25 election could undermine Russia's influence across the Western Balkans by depriving Moscow of its most important political ally in the region, while a new government seeking to tackle corruption may find it increasingly difficult to maintain close economic ties with the Kremlin, a report by the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center said.

Although the student-led opposition movement that won the election has pledged to maintain cooperation with Moscow, its plans to overhaul state institutions and improve transparency are likely to bring it into conflict with Russian business interests and political networks embedded in Serbia, Carnegie fellow Maksim Samorukov wrote in an analysis published on October 30.

"The two are mutually exclusive, even if the new leaders in Belgrade haven't yet realized it," Samorukov wrote, referring to the movement's stated ambitions to fight corruption while continuing lucrative cooperation with Russia.

The report argues that Moscow's relationship with Serbia has historically proved resilient to changes of government, but that the circumstances surrounding Vučić's departure are different from previous political transitions.

When Vučić's party came to power in 2012, replacing Boris Tadić, he maintained continuity in relations with Moscow by relying on established political figures with longstanding Kremlin connections. These included Aleksandar Vulin and Ivica Dačić, as well as Srbijagas chief Dušan Bajatović, who has served in the position since 2008 and remains a key interlocutor with Russian gas giant Gazprom.

Vučić himself, who speaks fluent Russian, developed close personal relationships with Russian officials and an understanding of the Kremlin's political sensitivities, allowing him to manage occasional disputes without seriously damaging bilateral relations.

The Student List lacks comparable connections, while the Socialist Party, which supplied many of Vučić's key contacts in Moscow, failed to enter parliament and is unlikely to participate in the new government.

Plans to remove officials associated with the previous administration from state institutions and companies could also threaten Russian interests, given the longstanding relationships between Russian businesses and Serbian political and economic elites.

Corruption fight could strain Moscow ties

Samorukov said the new leadership's commitment to institutional reform would be difficult to reconcile with the way Russian companies have traditionally conducted business in Serbia.

The Kremlin has said it hopes to maintain "constructive relations" with the incoming government, but its approach to the political transition could complicate efforts to preserve those ties.

For two years, Moscow has supported Vučić's portrayal of the student protests as a Western-backed attempt at regime change. The Kremlin's established hostility towards popular uprisings against pro-Russian governments, particularly following Ukraine's 2014 Maidan revolution, is likely to make it suspicious of the new Serbian authorities.

The diversity of the Student List movement could add to the tensions. Its members may make statements supporting closer European integration or criticising Russian policies, which Moscow could interpret as evidence that the election was part of a Western effort to weaken its position.

Samorukov argued that the Russian leadership had become increasingly unwilling to reconsider its established political assumptions, making it difficult for Moscow to adapt to the new situation in Belgrade.

The wider geopolitical environment has also changed since Vučić first came to power. Russia and the European Union were then still seeking areas of cooperation, including in Serbia, whereas Moscow now regards the EU as a strategic adversary.

Brussels has welcomed the election result and could offer the incoming government financial support and faster progress towards EU membership in exchange for reforms and closer alignment with European foreign policy.

Energy leverage and Kosovo

The immediate test of Serbia's balancing act could come through energy relations. The country's gas supply contract with Russia expires at the end of 2026, while negotiations over the sale of Russian-owned oil company NIS remain unresolved.

Samorukov said Moscow could use its position in the energy sector to exert pressure on the new government, leaving Belgrade to weigh the costs of maintaining its traditional relationship with Russia against the benefits of closer ties with the EU.

"On the one side is a wary and exigent Moscow, offering Serbia little more than energy blackmail," he wrote, contrasting this with a Brussels willing to support the new leadership's institutional and economic priorities.

Serbia's refusal to recognise Kosovo's independence remains a potential obstacle to closer alignment with the EU and a longstanding basis for cooperation with Russia, which opposes Kosovo's statehood.

However, Samorukov argued that Belgrade's reliance on Moscow over the issue should not be overstated. The Kremlin would be unlikely to change its position on Kosovo even if relations with Serbia deteriorated, potentially making it easier for the new government to reduce cooperation with Russia without immediately changing its own stance.

Regional implications

Vučić's departure could have consequences across the Western Balkans, where Russia has relied on Serbia's political and economic weight to maintain its influence.

Serbia is the largest country in the region, and under Vučić its political networks helped promote nationalist narratives and sustain ethnic tensions that complicated efforts to advance European integration.

Samorukov said the Kremlin had benefited from the overlap between its own regional objectives and Vučić's political strategy, with both sides exploiting nationalist sentiment and unresolved ethnic disputes.

"Without Vučić, Russia's influence in the Western Balkans can no longer count upon the state resources of the largest country in the region," he wrote.

He pointed to neighbouring Montenegro as a possible precedent for Serbia. The end of Milo Đukanović's long period in power was initially accompanied by fears that Russian influence and Serbian nationalism would regain ground. Instead, Montenegro's political transition and subsequent democratic reforms have helped it become one of the leading candidates for EU membership.

The report suggests Serbia could follow a similar path, although the transition will depend on whether the new leadership can overcome institutional resistance and deliver meaningful reforms.

For the EU, the election presents an opportunity to reduce Russian influence in a strategically important part of Europe while advancing the integration of the Western Balkans. Whether that opportunity is realised will depend partly on how quickly the incoming Serbian government translates its promises of institutional renewal into policy.