Vietnam’s 14th National Party Congress, which opens on January 19, arrives at a delicate moment for the country’s political and economic direction. After several years of leadership upheaval, the gathering is widely expected to draw a line under the turbulence by confirming To Lam as both general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and state president, a note by Capital Economics says. The move would reinforce continuity at the top, but at the cost of an unprecedented concentration of power in recent times.

Party congresses are always pivotal in Vietnam’s political cycle, setting leadership line-ups and policy priorities for the next five years. This one carries added weight after an extended period of instability triggered by an aggressive anti-corruption drive that has swept up ministers, senior party officials and even two presidents since 2022. While the campaign has enjoyed strong public support, the scale of the shake-up has slowed decision-making, encouraged official risk aversion and unsettled investors accustomed to Vietnam’s reputation for predictability.

Installing To Lam in both the party and state’s top roles would be a clear attempt to restore order. He assumed the party leadership in mid-2024 following the death of Nguyen Phu Trong and is now expected to secure a full term. Combining the two posts would break with the traditional system of collective leadership, in which power is shared among four pillars: the party chief, the president, the prime minister and the head of the National Assembly. That structure has long been designed to limit over-centralisation and preserve internal checks. Weakening those counterbalances could make policy errors harder to correct Capital Economics continues.

Beyond personnel, the congress will endorse the socio-economic strategy for 2026–30. Draft plans point to highly ambitious growth targets, reportedly approaching 10% a year. While such numbers may prove optimistic, near-term conditions remain supportive. Exports are expanding rapidly, buoyed by strong global demand for electronics and a surge in US-bound orders as companies diversify away from China. As such, Vietnam is once again benefiting from shifts in global supply chains.

The domestic picture has also improved. The property market is stabilising after the downturn of 2022–23, construction activity is recovering and household spending is being supported by rising incomes and a tight labour market. Yet new risks are emerging. A sharp increase in exports to the US has widened Vietnam’s trade surplus with Washington, potentially exposing it to renewed scrutiny if protectionist pressures intensify.

Financial stability is another significant concern. Credit growth has accelerated as confidence returns, prompting the central bank to rein in its lending targets to prevent overheating. At present, the banking system is still healing from the last property slump, and a fresh credit boom could create future vulnerabilities.

Over the longer term, however, structural challenges loom larger. Slowing growth in the working-age population means productivity gains will be increasingly important. That places reform of state-owned enterprises and the creation of a more supportive environment for private companies at the centre of the agenda. Recent party rhetoric has shifted in that direction, as Vietnam watchers have seen, elevating the private sector as the main engine of growth while casting state firms in a supporting role. Turning that language into substantive change will be crucial.

Externally too, Vietnam must continue to navigate intensifying rivalry between the US and China, managing economic ties with both without provoking backlash from either. The congress may help restore stability after a testing period, but the concentration of authority in one leader raises questions about how resilient the system will be as Vietnam confronts a more complex and demanding decade ahead.