On October 4, Brazilians went to the polls to vote for the president, two-thirds of the members of the Senate, all 513 members of the Federal Chamber of Deputies, the governors of the 26 states and the Federal District, and 1,059 legislators from the states and the federal district. The only offices that were not up for grabs this time were those of mayors, city councillors and one-third of the Senate, which will be elected in two years. All mandates in Brazil are of four years, and elections happen on fixed dates – the first Sunday of October, and the second round on the last Sunday of October. The turnout this time was 78.92% and the rate of abstention 21.08%, the second-highest in the country's democratic history.

Brazil has been using electronic voting since the beginning of this century. Once a party or candidate has been selected, the voter is shown the candidate's photograph on the screen before confirming or making any changes to their vote. The results are available within a few hours.

The presidential race will advance to a second round on October 25, as no candidate passed 50% of the valid votes. But whatever the runoff decides, the most important outcome is already settled: not who ends up in the Planalto Palace, but the political landscape that the next president will have to deal with.

Brazil today has lurched even further to the right.

The presidential race: Bolsonaro’s son comes first

Flávio Bolsonaro from the Liberal Party (PL) obtained 47.03%, which is about 56.1mn votes, while Lula da Silva from the Workers’ Party (PT) got 45.16%, or 53.9mn. The difference between them was approximately 2.2mn votes, equivalent to 1.87 percentage points.

What is interesting is not much that Flávio defied polls, beating Lula in the first round, but that Bolsonaro's movement has shown it is still politically powerful even in the face of Jair Bolsonaro's political and judicial problems. The former far-right president and Flavio’s father was sentenced to 27 years in prison for attempting a coup d’état following his narrow 2022 election defeat to Lula. He is currently serving his sentence under house arrest due to his health condition.

Since most of the other candidates came from the right or the centre-right, Flávio can now look to a potentially larger pool of voters to draw from. However, his campaign has also had considerable drawbacks, including accusations of corruption, money laundering, foreign-exchange evasion and connections with the militias in Rio de Janeiro. Lula will most certainly make use of these during the three-week runoff. But voters do not care much about these issues.

The first-round campaign, in fact, showed something more than a typical debate about corruption and the economy.

Religion, security and the traditional family are now at the heart of Brazilian politics.

Brazil has for a long time gotten along fairly well with its various religions. This state of social equilibrium is now changing. The far right has expanded greatly via evangelical networks, and religious intolerance has increasingly become a political weapon, especially against saints, atheists and afro-Brazilian religions.

A particularly revealing moment occurred during the campaign concerning Brazil's patron saint, Our Lady of Aparecida. Flávio, who is evangelical, had hinted at replacing her patronage with that of "Lord Jesus" to please his evangelical voters – “in my government Brazil will become the land of Lord Jesus.” In the end, the Superior Electoral Court and the Supreme Court got involved because of the dimension this controversy achieved. Brazil is a secular state and has no official religion.

That dispute was not simply a matter of disagreement concerning religion; it demonstrated the way in which cultural identity, faith and political mobilisation have become closely intertwined.

Security, family and the politics of fear

The security and corruption issues that Flávio Bolsonaro's campaign highlighted were wrapped in a moral argument focused on family values, and this message resonated strongly with his voters.

It is striking that accusations of corruption do not always damage the candidate if the voters think that he stands for something more important – such as the defence of the family, religion, order and opposition to Lula.

This is where the traditional political divide takes on a cultural dimension.

The far-right does not regard Lula's progressive policies about LGBT+ rights, gender equality, the environment and equal treatment of different religions as ideas with which it is possible to respectfully disagree, but rather as threats to the traditional family as created by God.

The difference is just as great in the area of public security.

Lula's ideology places a strong focus on education, full-time schools, and sports and cultural activities, along with strict rule of law and community policing. In contrast, Bolsonaro's political team promotes a much more stringent approach, openly expressing its support for police forces who have wide powers to shoot suspected criminals point-blank and citing El Salvador under Nayib Bukele as an example.

The case is straightforward in that insecurity leads to fear; fear in turn causes a demand for order, and the far right provides just that, but in its most brutal form.

The real earthquake is in Congress

Bolsonaro’s PL has become the largest party in the 513-member Chamber of Deputies, having secured 121 seats, whereas the leftist PT has 70. União Brasil has 46 seats, and the rest of the deputies are spread out among a wide range of smaller parties ranging from the centre-left to the centre-right and the right. In total, the centre-right, right and far right managed to get about 70% of the seats.

It does not follow that all the deputies outside the PL and the PT belong to a single ideological group. They don't. For example, the parties Union Brazil, the PP, the PSD, the MDB and the Republicanos include politicians who hold different views and have diverse political interests.

There is no doubt about one thing: the centre of gravity within Congress has shifted to the right. The Senate presents an even clearer situation.

The Liberal Party (PL) went from having 15 to 28 of the 81 senators. Among the newly elected are notable allies or family members of Bolsonaro, such as Michelle Bolsonaro – the wife of Jair Bolsonaro - and Bia Kicis in the Federal District, Carlos Bolsonaro – another son of Jair Bolsonaro - and Carol de Toni in Santa Catarina, and Filipe Barros and Deltan Dallagnol in Paraná. The second-best-positioned party in the Senate was the Workers’ Party with 9 senators.

This matters greatly.

The Senate is responsible for approving important appointments, such as Supreme Court judges and ambassadors, carrying out its constitutional oversight duties, and having the authority to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president, judges of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General of the Republic. A Senate that is much more aligned with Bolsonaro thus alters the balance among Congress, the executive and the judiciary.

The Attorney General and the Judges of the Supreme Court who last year condemned Jair Bolsonaro, generals and his allies for the attempted coup will now face a Congress where Bolsonaro's political faction has a great deal more institutional power. These elected members of parliament have made no secret of their plans to impeach Supreme Court Judges.

The Bolsonaro movement has not just survived the damning allegations of undermining democracy – it has managed to become institutionalised.

The right is also conquering the states

The change is not limited to Brasília, as Brazil is a federation and state governors hold considerable power.

In the first round of the elections for Brazil's 27 state governments, 20 of them were decided – a record achievement since the country returned to democracy – and seven will have a second round on October 25.

The PL secured five governorships, among them those in Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Roraima and Rondônia; Republicanos won three as well, namely São Paulo and Minas Gerais – two of the country's most economically and politically important states.

The Workers’ Party kept the important strongholds in the Northeast, such as the states of Piauí, Bahia and Ceará.

This matters since it stops the election from being interpreted in an excessively simple way. Brazil has not suddenly morphed into a uniformly right-wing country, the Northeast still being a key base for the left and centrist parties retaining a great deal of power.

However, the latest right-wing tide could shape some of the country's most powerful state governments, while politicians aligned with Bolsonaro have become more and more embedded in both local and national institutions.

What has caused Brazil’s pivot to the right?

The answer is not all down to Bolsonaro. A major change has taken place in the field of political communication.

A number of the candidates who did most successfully in this election were good at leveraging the power of social media – this explains why the Federal Chamber of Deputies became younger. Several of the most outspoken personalities from the previous legislature have been re-elected too.

The paradox of social media, also increasingly seen in the West, is that most of its hardline users promote very retrograde views on women's and LGBTQ+ rights, the environment and social equality. They have become skilled in the language of digital politics to promote backward or “Middle Ages” values, as put by a well-known Brazilian political analyst, Josias de Souza, and that in itself could make a good headline: “Brazilian election: where 21st century and Middle Ages meet.”

The formula is both simple and effective in that it involves short viral videos, outrage, memes, religious messages, a fear of crime, attacks on institutions, especially certain Supreme Court judges, and a state of constant confrontation. In short, visceral emotion and hate rather than complexity, just reproducing the old formula for engagement. But this generates votes.

Another way to sway voters remains money.

A number of older politicians, although not very active on social media, have been highly successful in electoral terms, thanks to amendments to the parliamentary budget (emendas parlamentares). The system was greatly extended during Jair Bolsonaro's tenure to keep Congress faithful to him, and as a result the assembly acquired greater control over discretionary public spending.

Politicians can allocate funds to projects within their electoral districts, and roads, health, sports centres, infrastructure and other local projects serve as clear, visible evidence of what a member of congress has "delivered".

The political reasons are clear in that resources should be provided for the area in order to increase the chances of being re-elected.

The third point is the way in which a sense of insecurity is turned into a political identity and voting-maker.

Brazil indeed has real problems related to crime and violence. The far-right has turned this sense of insecurity into a simple political proposition by calling for more police power, fewer restrictions, and a tougher state.

El Salvador under Bukele has become a role model.

Argentina under Javier Milei has become another benchmark, above all else for economic liberalism.

Donald Trump is now the standard by which international politics is measured.

The result is a strange blend of ideologies: authoritarianism in the field of security policy, radical economic liberalism, evangelical conservatism, and “neo-medieval” opposition to progressive social policies.

The legacy of Bolsonaro

Flávio Bolsonaro obtained a greater number of votes than his father, which is a notable feat in itself. When asked about the difference between himself and Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio stated, "I have a calmer temperament, I smile more and appear more peaceful and moderate. But Bolsonaro's blood runs through my veins."

Jair Bolsonaro was very clear about who he was and never concealed his radical views. Scientists, environmentalists, minorities and the political opposition knew what to expect.

Flávio gives off a more gentle impression, especially in front of investors and among more moderate voters. However, his core political principles remain closely tied to those of his father, and his rhetoric is deeply steeped in conservative evangelical values.

Another point is that, just like with Trump and Milei, allegations and scandals do not always lead to a loss of support.

This is due to a well-oiled playbook being adopted by far-right movements all over the world: they first disqualify and delegitimise the institutions – in Brazil, the democracy itself and the Supreme Court - then discredit the decisions of those institutions, and finally make corruption seem normal.

In Brazil the Supreme Court played a key role in punishing the coup attempted by Jair Bolsonaro and his allies in 2023. But the resulting convictions, along with the imposed prison sentences, increased the political rivalry and fuelled hate towards the Supreme Court and some judges. In particular, Alexandre De Moraes, the rapporteur of the Bolsonaro case at the Supreme Court, was depicted as a Lula supporter.

To make things worse, De Moraes, along with other Judges, including those appointed by Bolsonaro, have been embroiled in the notorious Banco Master scandal. Just like Flavio, who sought $24mn from disgraced banker Daniel Vorcaro to finance a biopic movie about his father. But the far right's selective lens on corruption lets it ignore this, while insisting that because the Supreme Court is corrupt, its decisions are corrupt too.

Whenever Congress is corrupt, then everybody is corrupt. If all people are corrupt, corruption ceases to be significant.

The core argument is that, if corruption is unavoidable, voters should pick the candidate who at least commits himself to protecting the traditional family, restoring order and overcoming insecurity.

In this way, institutional distrust can be translated into political loyalty.

The left has a different problem

The left and Lula, meanwhile, are grappling with a quite different communication environment.

The 80-year-old leftist leader has been able to highlight several important social achievements, such as Brazil's recovery in the struggle against hunger, the sharp reduction of poverty, the implementation of social, educational and health programmes, and the expansion of opportunities for millions of people.

However, these laudable feats are blasts from the past and remain tied to a strong political image. To many voters, the PT is associated with corruption.

From the right, the left's social agenda is presented as an attack on the traditional family; vaccination and compulsory schooling are described as attacks on individual freedom; LGBT+ rights are shown as a threat to children; women's empowerment is associated with a danger to the traditional family; and environmental protection is portrayed as an obstacle to agribusiness, presented as what is “saving Brazil” economically.

Lula's environmental policies directly clash with the powerful economic interests in the agribusiness and illegal mining sectors.

His socialist sovereignism and multilateral foreign policy are portrayed as being against Trump and the implementation of international conservatism in Brazil.

The far-right, therefore, crafted a highly effective political narrative that sees Lula as a threat and Bolsonaro as a form of protection.

This message is naturally amplified by the system underpinning the post-truth era, which has not spared Brazil.

The South American nation is one of the biggest users of Western social media, with WhatsApp, X and TikTok being especially influential. Members of older generations spend a great deal of time in WhatsApp groups, where memes, videos and political messages are passed on within closed communities. As is well known, the algorithms of American social media platforms tend to privilege right and far-right messaging, which generates more engagement and monetisation.

This creates echo chambers in which individuals keep coming across information that supports the beliefs they already have.

It is at this point that the role of American far-right political networks which twice propelled Trump into power, such as those linked to Steve Bannon and other "alt-right" political consultants, comes into play. The digital campaigning techniques developed in the United States have crossed borders without much difficulty.

A new political map

The first round of Brazil’s election has produced more than just a closely contested race between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro. It has strengthened the institutional power of the right and far-right.

The PL is now the biggest party in the Chamber of Deputies, and its group in the Senate has almost doubled in size and has the biggest number of state governors. Politicians who support Bolsonaro have increased their representation in the states. Evangelical conservatism has made big strides within the mainstream political debate. Issues relating to security and the traditional family have become the key themes in elections. Social media has radically changed the way political communication is carried out.

Meanwhile, just like in many other countries across Latin America, the conventional democratic right-wing has mostly vanished, being replaced by an illiberal right and a far-right movement. A political class liberal in the economic sphere and much less so in the areas of institutions, social rights and democratic pluralism.

Lula still won almost 54mn votes, the PT maintains strong support in various regions, and centrist parties still hold a share of seats in Congress. Lula will now woo these moderate voters who have been squeezed by intense polarisation, while also trying to persuade absentees to turn out.

Both candidates have a realistic path to victory in the runoff. But whoever wins will inherit a country whose political centre of gravity has decisively moved to the right – and towards the far-right.

Ricardo Martins is based in Utrecht, the Netherlands, and has a PhD in Sociology specialising in European politics, geopolitics and international relations.