International attention has been focussed on the upcoming April 12 general election in Hungary that will pit Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his long-ruling Fidesz party against a strong challenge from the opposition Tisza movement. The contest has increasingly been framed as geopolitically significant, a turning point for the country as it chooses between Orbán’s self-described “illiberal” model — sceptical of Brussels and pragmatic toward Moscow — and an alternative that pledges to restore closer alignment with the European Union’s mainstream.

Yet two other elections are coming up this spring, in Bulgaria and Slovenia, that will also hinge on a complex array of factors including domestic issues, and positioning within the European Union, and vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine. While the personalities and political fracture lines are different, both elections will also be significant for the political landscape in Central Europe — the key question being whether they will add to the illiberal bloc comprising Hungary, Slovakia and, since the autumn 2025 election, Czechia, but without Poland since Donald Tusk's Civic Coalition ousted of Law and Justice (PiS) in 2023. 

Hungary’s political divide is fairly clear-cut. Orbán has built a system that concentrates power domestically while cultivating close ties with Russia and China. His critics accuse him of eroding democratic checks and balances; his supporters argue he has defended Hungarian sovereignty and shielded the country from external pressures and values imposed by Brussels.

Fragmentation and fatigue in Bulgaria 

By contrast, the political scenes in Southeast Europe, Bulgaria in particular, are more fragmented. Bulgaria is preparing for yet another parliamentary vote — its eighth in five years — amid deep political fatigue and persistent instability.

Recent opinion polls suggest that a political formation associated with former president Rumen Radev would emerge as the largest force if elections were held now. One recent poll placed such a formation comfortably ahead of the centre-right GERB, the largest party in recent parliaments, while another also showed it leading, albeit by a narrower margin. The reformist Change Continues-Democratic Bulgaria (CC-DB) is in third place, followed by far-right Vazrazdanie, with nationalist and smaller parties clustered near the parliamentary threshold.

The outlook is highly uncertain, not least because with the election just weeks away on April 19, Radev has not formally launched a party. Nevertheless, expectations are high that his entry to parliamentary politics is imminent.

Backed in his first presidential race in 2017 by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, Radev later found common cause with the reformist CC-DB in their efforts to root out high-level corruption. However, Radev’s positioning shifted markedly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine four years ago. Past-invasion, Bulgarian politics reformed around a new divide: broadly pro-Russian actors — including Radev and the Socialists — on one side, with the pro-Western parties such as CC-DB and GERB uncomfortably cooperating on the other.

That split ran so deep that the government of former prime minister Kiril Petkov of CC-DB was revealed to have secretly supplied Ukraine with fuel and ammunition in the early months of the war, because of pro-Russian sympathies within parts of the political establishment.

As president, Radev advocated what he termed “non-involvement” in the war, opposing military aid to Kyiv and expressing scepticism about sanctions on Moscow. His position has been closer to that of Croatian President Zoran Milanović than to Orban, left-leaning but highly critical of military support for Ukraine.

Such a platform could draw voters from nationalist and pro-Russian parties, as well as disillusioned abstainers. But while a Radev-led formation may win the largest share of votes, forming a stable majority would be far more complex, as the last seven parliaments have shown.

Any government would depend on whether Radev chose to cooperate with GERB, the reformist CC-DB, or smaller nationalist forces. A fully pro-Russian coalition appears arithmetically unlikely. Even so, the emergence of a strong Radev-led bloc could complicate the formation of a clear pro-European majority.

Bulgaria’s broader orientation remains contested but institutionally anchored in the EU and Nato. The country’s newly appointed caretaker Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov has reaffirmed that its pro-Western trajectory is a “core value” and strategic commitment. 

Janša poised to return in Slovenia 

Slovenia’s parliamentary election, scheduled for March 22, is shaping up as a contest between Prime Minister Robert Golob’s Freedom Movement and the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) led by former premier Janez Janša.

Recent polls consistently place the SDS ahead, with support in the low-to-mid twenties, while Golob’s party trails in the mid-to-high teens, support having eroded since its landslide victory in 2022. Seat projections suggest a fragmented parliament of up to seven parties, with the centre-right bloc potentially close to, but not guaranteed, a governing majority.

Janša, a veteran politician and close ally of Orbán, has set ambitious goals. He is aiming for a two-thirds constitutional majority to push through reforms including tax caps, stronger decentralisation and expanded protections for parental rights and freedom of expression. He has ruled out cooperation with parties from the current governing coalition, framing the election as a choice between “constructive” and “wasteful” governance.

Like Orbán, Janša began his career as a pro-democracy reformer before moving toward a more nationalist and conservative platform. Yet Slovenia’s geopolitical positioning differs notably from Hungary’s. While Janša aligns with Orbán on sovereignty and scepticism toward deeper EU integration, he has been a strong supporter of Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion. As prime minister, he was among the first European leaders to visit Kyiv during the war and has backed sanctions and military assistance. Indeed, support for Ukraine remains broadly shared across most of Slovenia’s political spectrum, with the exception of the Left party, which has taken a more pacifist stance.

A Janša victory could strengthen cooperation with Hungary and reinforce a Central European bloc more resistant to EU migration policy and institutional pressure — though without Budapest’s ambivalence toward Kyiv. 

Ahead of this spring’s elections, although Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovenia have distinct domestic dynamics, several parallels emerge.

All three elections reflect fatigue with established political elites and frustration over corruption or governance standards. Each also intersects with the broader European debate over sovereignty, EU integration and the war in Ukraine. 

In Hungary, the divide is between Orbán’s Russia-friendly illiberalism and his pro-EU challenger. In Bulgaria, the split runs through a fragmented party system, where a Radev-led force would likely alter but not easily dominate coalition-building. In Slovenia, a rightward shift is anticipated, yet the broad cross-party consensus on support for Ukraine sets it apart from Orban’s stance. Together, the three votes are set to impact the political landscape of Central and Southeast Europe, reinforcing, fracturing or complicating the illiberal bloc within the EU.