As critical elections approach in Hungary and Armenia this spring, the recent experience of Moldova is increasingly being brought up by politicians, analysts and election observers. 

Over the past two years, Moldova effectively become a test case for how democracies on Russia’s periphery confront alleged hybrid interference during elections. Moldova held a presidential election and constitutional referendum in October 2024 and parliamentary elections in September 2025, both under what the Moldovan authorities and election observers described as unprecedented foreign pressure.

There were multiple allegations of Russian interference – including vote-buying, disinformation campaigns and attempts to destabilise the political environment. Despite these, pro-European forces retained power and Moldova avoided the widespread unrest that was considered a possibility pre-election. That experience is now being studied as countries facing their own high-stakes elections prepare for similar challenges.

“Malign foreign actors leveraged all possible channels of interference in Moldova’s elections – across presidential, parliamentary, and referendum elections held in the span of 18 months,” the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) said in a case study titled ‘A Lesson in Resilience: Moldova’s Resistance to Election Interference’, published in December 2025.

“While new tactics and tools of foreign interference proliferated in Moldova’s elections, the country’s effective response strategy proves instructive in what may be key to building resilience,” the IFES paper added. 

On the frontline

Moldovan President Maia Sandu has warned that the stakes go beyond national politics. Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg in January, Sandu framed Moldova’s recent elections as part of a wider confrontation between democratic systems and what she described as Russia’s hybrid warfare.

“Europe faces two wars,” she said. “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; and an equally dangerous, less visible hybrid war involving disinformation, cyberattacks, and external interference in European democracies.

“These wars are not separate. They reinforce each other,” she added. “Russia's military aggression and its hybrid operations pursue the same objective: to undermine, control, and divide Europe. One destroys cities, the other erodes trust. One uses missiles, the other uses money, narratives, and manipulation.”

Sandu said Moldova had become one of the front lines in this struggle. “In the information war against democracies, Moldova remains on the front line – facing major electoral interference, energy crises, information warfare, and cyber operations aimed at destabilising Moldovan democracy and steering it toward Russia’s influence,” she said.

“I cannot emphasise elections enough. In democracies, they are the most vulnerable entry point for foreign manipulation, and the most decisive one.”

Allegations of massive interference

Moldovan authorities say the 2024-25 election cycle was marked by a broad array of alleged Russian hybrid tactics. In an interview with bne IntelliNews in October 2024, Sandu’s foreign policy adviser Olga Rosca spoke of estimates Russia could spend up to $100mn to influence the autumn 2024 elections. 

According to IFES, Moscow expanded its activities dramatically following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, using tools ranging from cyber attacks to illicit financing networks.

“Russia targeted Moldova with hybrid attacks during its elections,” the organisation said. “The pace and scale of cyber incidents, widescale vote-buying and illegal campaign donations, misinformation campaigns, and other interference threats have proliferated since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”

Authorities also accused Russia of running training camps for Moldovan provocateurs in Serbia and Bosnia’s majority-Serb entity Republika Srpska. In February, three Moldovan citizens who participated in the camps were sentenced in absentia.

Much of the alleged influence campaign, investigators and Moldovan officials say, was coordinated by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, who fled the country in 2019 after being convicted in connection with a massive bank fraud scandal.

Institutions fight back

Despite the scale of the alleged interference, Moldova’s pro-EU leadership ultimately held onto power. The October 2024 presidential election returned Sandu to office, though by a narrow margin. Meanwhile, the constitutional referendum enshrining Moldova’s EU membership aspirations also passed after a fiercely contested campaign. The following year, parliamentary elections again produced a victory for pro-EU forces.

The outcome is partly attributed to new measures introduced after the first round of elections. “In the months following the 2024 elections, Moldova’s governing institutions carried out enforcement actions against election violations,” IFES said.

In April 2025 police began fining voters who had accepted bribes, although fines were waived if individuals cooperated with investigators. Later that year, a political leader from the autonomous region of Gagauzia was sentenced to seven years in prison for funneling illicit funds into the electoral process. Authorities also strengthened cyber security and financial oversight mechanisms ahead of the 2025 vote. The Central Electoral Commission enhanced monitoring of campaign financing, while the government created a new Center for Strategic Communication and Counteracting Disinformation to combat information warfare.

Sandu herself pointed to stronger law enforcement as a turning point. “This year, the Prosecutor’s Office did its job according to the law and there were results,” she said after the 2025 vote. “These schemes stopped … We have now seen that the state can be efficient when institutions respect the law and fulfil their obligations.”

Critics of the Moldovan authorities argue that Sandu and her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) went too far to keep the country on its EU path, adopting strategies that would, under normal circumstances, be considered on the verge of unconstitutional. 

The OSCE/ODHIR final report issued after the election stated that: “An organised network, funded by foreign sources, coordinating targeted vote-buying schemes and disinformation campaigns, was credibly identified by the authorities and investigative journalists as originating from the Russian Federation.” 

It added: “Some isolated instances of campaigning by PAS government officials may have blurred the line between party and State, contrary to OSCE commitments and good practice.” 

Hungary’s high-stakes vote

Moldova’s experience is now relevant beyond its borders, including in Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán faces what is seen as his toughest electoral challenge in decades. The April 12 vote will pit Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party against the opposition Tisza movement led by Peter Magyar, a former Orbán ally.

“In Hungary the elections are shaping up to be the most serious challenge to incumbent Viktor Orban in his more than 20 years in power,” emerging markets strategist Tim Ash wrote in a note. “The opposition Tisza movement… has had a consistent 8-10 point lead in opinion polls.”

As in Moldova, allegations of Russian interference have surfaced in the weeks before the vote. The Washington Post reported on March 21, in an article authored by Russia expert Catherine Belton, that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) considered staging an assassination attempt against Orban to tilt the election in his favour.

Previously, investigative website VSquare reported that specialists linked to Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, had arrived in Hungary under diplomatic cover.  According to investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi, citing multiple European intelligence sources, the Kremlin deployed “a three-member team to its embassy in Budapest under diplomatic status”. The mission, Panyi reported, is overseen by Sergei Kiriyenko, a senior aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin who manages Moscow’s political influence operations.

Hungarian security analyst Ferenc Fresz said the alleged operation suggested a shift in Russia’s approach to Hungary. “VSquare’s insights reveal that Hungary’s operational oversight has been assigned to the directorate responsible for the post-Soviet region,” Fresz wrote in his CyberThreat Report. 

That designation indicates “the Kremlin no longer views the country as a sovereign partner but rather as a near-abroad vassal,” he added. 

The hybrid campaign could include digital disinformation and “narrative laundering”, with AI-generated content amplified through bot networks and local media, Fresz said.

The battle to control the parliament in Budapest has become an increasingly dirty fight. A sex tape surfaced during the campaign, allegedly showing opposition leader Peter Magyar, recorded secretly in August 2024 with his girlfriend at the time. Magyar said he did not realise he had become part of a "Russian-style intelligence operation" aimed at compromising him. 

Security analyst Peter Buda said the objectives in Hungary differ from those in Moldova. “Unlike in Moldova, where the goal was to destabilise a pro-Western government, in Hungary the focus is on keeping a Moscow-aligned party in power and amplifying external threat perceptions,” he wrote. Such messaging could link perceived security threats to opposition parties and promote “the narrative that only the current government can ensure national security”.

Orbán’s government has rejected accusations of Russian interference, while Moscow has denied any involvement.

The Hungarian election is seen as particularly significant as it is likely to have consequences well beyond the country itself.

“An Orban defeat in April would make EU decision making around Ukraine easier,” Ash wrote. “It would isolate Slovak leader [Prime Minister Robert] Fico, and make it more difficult for him to block efforts to support Ukraine.”

Moreover, according to Ash, it could send a broader signal about the political direction of Europe. “I think it would also send a message to GOP/MAGA and the far right in Europe that electorates might not be that comfortable with parties pushing socially illiberal agendas when backed by increasingly autocratic means and shades of kleptocracy,” Ash said.

Armenian election approaches

Further east, Armenia is also preparing for a politically charged election in June, where Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract is likely to emerge as the frontrunner but with a diminished number of parliament seats. Armenia’s loss of Nagorno-Karabakh after its military defeat by Azerbaijan and a bitter row with leading Orthodox clerics have eroded the prime minister’s support. 

Meanwhile, Pashinyan has sought closer ties with the European Union, while also pursuing a peace process with Azerbaijan. He has argued that senior figures within the Church hierarchy serve Russia’s interests and back the opposition within Armenia. 

Ahead of the election, Armenian authorities say they are already detecting signs of possible foreign interference. The country’s Foreign Intelligence Service recently warned that security services of a foreign state were pressuring Armenians living abroad to support opposition forces.

“They are being told to take financial, ‘organisational’ and other actions for that purpose,” the agency said in a statement to the Armenpress news agency.

The statement did not name the country involved, but officials hinted at Russia. Vahagn Aleksanian, a deputy chairman of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, suggested that Armenians abroad could be mobilised to influence the vote, reported Azatutyun.

Pashinyan himself has referred to rumours that “they [the opposition] will be bringing people from Russia” to participate in the election. “Let them bring [such people] because 84.5% of those who will come, according to the polls we have conducted there, will vote for us,” he said during a campaign visit to Gyumri, according to Azatutyun.

The Armenian government has taken the step of asking the European Union to deploy a hybrid rapid response team ahead of the vote. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in December the bloc had already observed disinformation activity similar to that seen in Moldova.

“Russian-backed networks were already deploying disinformation campaigns in Armenia, following a ‘playbook’ identical to operations previously observed in Moldova,” Kallas said. “The European Union will do everything to be there for you,” she added, saying EU funding would support “detection, analysis and response to foreign interference”.

On March 17, Kallas announced the EU would send a specialised team to Armenia to help counter potential foreign interference ahead of the parliamentary elections. “We will not leave Armenia to face foreign interference alone. Democracies under pressure can count on Europe,” she wrote in a Facebook post.

On March 24, it was reported that Bulgaria, which will also hold a general election on April 19, has activated the European mechanism against disinformation and foreign interference. 

Meanwhile, a report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) think-tank titled 'Defending the Vote - Policy Responses to Information Warfare in Bulgaria' says Bulgaria "faces sustained Russian information manipulation pressure compounded by a deeply embedded domestic amplification ecosystem" ahead of the general and presidential elections in April and November, respectively.  

Competing narratives

The idea of a “Moldova scenario” has itself become politically contested, and in Armenia both government and opposition figures have accused each other of following Moldova-inspired tactics. 

Russian officials argue that Western involvement in election monitoring and counter-disinformation efforts risks undermining sovereignty.

Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said earlier in March the EU’s planned mission in Armenia resembled what she called the “Moldovan scenario”, reported Russian news agency RIA Novosti.

“Sending a so-called ‘rapid response team’ to the republic… is essentially an obvious projection of the ‘Moldovan scenario’ onto Armenia,” she said.

Zakharova claimed such initiatives could produce “the opposite effect” by weakening the country’s independence.

Within Armenia, former president Robert Kocharyan accused the government of potentially copying Moldova’s approach to restrict opposition forces. “I have no doubt that the Armenian authorities will try to apply Moldova’s example here as well,” Kocharyan told reporters, Sputnik Armenia reported. “When geopolitical interests are at stake, everyone forgets about democracy, that’s a fact.”

Meanwhile, researchers say disinformation campaigns in Armenia are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Hasmik Hambardzumyan, editor-in-chief of the Armenian fact-checking outlet Fact Investigation Platform, said the information environment had changed dramatically. “The dissemination of narratives has become more organised, circulates more quickly and is significantly more targeted,” Hambardzumyan told DW.

She added that new technologies were appearing for the first time in Armenia’s online space. “AI-generated photos, audio and deepfakes are appearing in Armenia's information space for the first time.”

For Armenia, there are much closer parallels with the Moldovan experience, as both countries have a government that is seeking closer integration with the EU facing an opposition linked to Russia. Moldova faced an array of hybrid tactics from vote-buying networks and cyber attacks to coordinated disinformation campaigns. Its institutions, civil society and international partners ultimately prevented those efforts from overturning the electoral process.

IFES’ report noted that the 2025 election campaign was “marred by serious cases of foreign interference, illegal funding, cyberattacks and widespread disinformation”, but despite those challenges, the vote went ahead and the results were broadly accepted. Now, with elections approaching in other countries in the broader region, Moldova is seen as a potential blueprint for how democracies might defend themselves in an era of hybrid warfare.