In its quest to gain access to the sea to facilitate exports, Uzbekistan is eyeing the Iranian port at Chabahar, situated in the Gulf of Oman. But even in the exploratory phase, Tashkent is encountering significant obstacles.  

Facilitating Uzbek access to Chabahar was high on the agenda of the first-ever trilateral consultations on the foreign ministerial-level involving India, Iran and Uzbekistan, held in the Iranian capital Tehran earlier in September. The delegations were headed by mid-level Foreign Ministry officials. The leader of the Uzbek delegation, for example, was Gulamjon Primkulov, who heads the ministry’s section for cooperation with South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 

“The three parties stressed expanding and deepening cooperation, especially in the areas related to connectivity, utilizing the strategic position of ports in this regard, and the International North-South Transit Corridor,” said a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting. No Chabahar-related agreements were announced, but the statement also noted that the participants “reviewed the progress made on decisions adopted at the third meeting of the Chabahar Working Group held in November 2024 in Mumbai, India.” 

Slicing through the jargon, it seems the trilateral meeting did not accomplish much, despite the apparent desire on all sides to boost trade. A few days prior to the gathering, however, Uzbek entities committed to purchasing 300,000 tonnes of Iranian steel in 2025. 

Chabahar’s attractiveness as a hub for seaborne exports lies in the fact that it is strategically situated beyond the Straits of Hormuz. In 2024, India signed a 10-year deal to upgrade and operate the port, seeing the facility as a counterweight to the Chinese-built port at Gwadar in Pakistan situated along the coast from Chabahar on the Arabian Sea.  

But Chabahar now finds itself caught in trade limbo after US President Donald Trump issued a directive in February for the State Department to “modify or rescind” a sanctions waiver for the port. The State Department in 2018 exempted Chabahar from sanctions on Iran, reasoning at the time that the port would serve as a key cog in facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The US strategic calculus has since changed, due to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.  

The recent squabbling between President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has added an additional layer of uncertainty to the question of Chabahar’s viability.  

For Uzbekistan, the Iranian port’s status is only part of a larger problem that must be solved before Tashkent can hope to reach its export goals. Rail routes connecting Uzbekistan and Iran need to be significantly improved to handle the hoped-for increases in cargo volume.

To reach Iran, Uzbek cargo needs to pass through either Afghanistan or Turkmenistan, and Tashkent has been working hard to expand capacity via both routes. Uzbek railway officials signed a memo of understanding in 2024 with their Turkmen counterparts covering the expansion of freight traffic. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan has announced the start of work on a trans-Afghan railway project. Iran, for its part, stated in July that it would open or expand rail links to Afghanistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan. But realistically, it will be years before any of the expansion plans are realised.  

This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.