The 1,443-km East African Crude Oil Pipeline will finally give landlocked Uganda a route to global oil markets while handing Tanzania transit income and a platform for a wider energy hub. But with costs at about $5.6bn, conventional Western bank financing constrained and downstream projects still incomplete, the larger regional economic payoff remains unproven.

Nearly two decades after Uganda discovered commercial oil, the Lake Albert development is approaching its operating phase. The East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), which runs from Uganda's Albertine Graben to the Chongoleani terminal near Tanzania's Port of Tanga, was 92.7% built as of August 31, according to the project company. It is expected to be ready to receive crude by mid-December 2026, with the government now targeting commercial oil production before the end of June 2027.

Uganda discovered commercial reserves in 2006 and estimates about 6.5bn barrels of petroleum in place, of which recent government reporting puts roughly 1.65bn barrels as recoverable. Its landlocked position, however, has long limited the commercial value of those resources without a route to the Indian Ocean — the gap EACOP is designed to close. Crude from Uganda's fields will travel through the pipeline to the Tanzanian coast for export, making the country a crude exporter even as it stays heavily dependent on imported refined fuels until domestic processing capacity expands.

Uganda's route to market

The Lake Albert project reached its final investment decision in 2022, bringing together the TotalEnergies-operated Tilenga field, the CNOOC-operated Kingfisher field and EACOP, with combined development costs then put at about $10bn. The Petroleum Authority of Uganda puts cumulative investment across the country's oil and gas sector at $9.96bn by the end of 2024.

Costs have since climbed. EACOP alone is now estimated at about $5.6bn, around 55% more than the $3.6bn projected shortly before FID, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). The pipeline is 62% owned by TotalEnergies (Euronext Paris: TTE) and 8% by CNOOC (HKEX: 0883), with the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) and Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) each holding 15%.

At peak, Tilenga and Kingfisher are expected to produce about 230,000 barrels per day (bpd), against an EACOP design capacity of 246,000 bpd. President Yoweri Museveni has named the export blend "Pearl Sweet" for its relatively low sulphur content, and Uganda has appointed Vitol to market it.

That timetable has slipped repeatedly. Commissioning was once targeted for July 2026; by September, officials were saying the pipeline should be ready to receive crude only by mid-December, with first commercial production pushed to before the end of June 2027. The latest guidance leaves room for Kingfisher to come on stream ahead of Tilenga, though both are expected to begin producing within that window.

Uganda's own contribution has added to its exposure. UNOC's 15% EACOP stake has been funded through government equity contributions and cash calls, a fiscal commitment that sits alongside the oil revenues still to come.

Even so, becoming a crude exporter will not free Uganda from imported fuel. UNOC says the country still buys in roughly 95% of its petroleum products — nearly 2.96bn litres a year — through Kenya, via the Port of Mombasa and the Kenya Pipeline Company system. Crude exports should bring in foreign exchange and fiscal revenue, but they will not by themselves erase that fuel-import bill or shield domestic consumers from international refined-product prices.

Nor will they settle Uganda's exposure to oil-price swings and longer-term demand risk. Brian Serunjongi, a senior research fellow at Makerere University's Economic Policy Research Centre, said oil revenues should improve Uganda's debt, tax and foreign-reserve metrics, but cautioned that "oil revenues cannot fix all our economic problems".

Fresh commentary on the latest delay strikes a similar note. The EastAfrican reported on September 19 that first oil could strengthen tax receipts, foreign reserves, debt metrics and sovereign creditworthiness in the short term, even as the timing of actual exports stays uncertain while Kingfisher and Tilenga head towards separate start dates.

The longer-term picture, IEEFA argues, is increasingly sensitive to delays, cost overruns and weaker prices. Its January modelling found that accelerated global decarbonisation could cut the value of Uganda's oil to the country by as much as 53% against its base case, while the difficulty of securing debt for EACOP has forced shareholders to put in more capital than they had planned.

Tanzania's transit and hub ambitions

For Tanzania, the proposition is different: monetising geography rather than producing the crude. Dar es Salaam holds 15% through TPDC and stands to earn transit and throughput revenue, while the Chongoleani marine terminal — built for tankers of up to 150,000 deadweight tonnes — gives Tanga a new role as an export gateway.

That coastal foothold is also the springboard for the proposed Tanga regional energy hub, a storage, refining and trading complex that Dar es Salaam estimates could eventually draw more than $20bn. The figure is prospective, resting on a non-binding memorandum between TPDC, UNOC and Vitol Bahrain rather than committed capital, and it builds on an existing commercial relationship between UNOC and Vitol Bahrain that already spans fuel supply and wider petroleum-infrastructure cooperation. The Guardian noted in August that the real test will be whether individual refining, storage and logistics projects can attract capital, establish workable ownership structures and keep meaningful value within East Africa.

Tanzania's wider energy position has strengthened in parallel. In August, commissioning of the 2,115MW Julius Nyerere hydropower plant lifted installed generating capacity to 4,646MW, against peak demand of about 2,271MW — a surplus that reinforces Tanga's case as an East African energy and logistics node.

Financing has been a recurring difficulty. With many international banks declining to back EACOP, its shareholders supplied much of the capital themselves before EACOP Ltd closed a first external financing tranche in March 2025, drawing in Afreximbank, Standard Bank of South Africa, Stanbic Bank Uganda, KCB Bank Uganda and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector.

Other arrangements sit alongside the project rather than within it. UNOC has agreements to borrow up to $2bn from Vitol Bahrain for broader petroleum investments, which is not confirmed EACOP project debt; and while TotalEnergies has agreed a $1.8bn African infrastructure transaction with BlackRock's Global Infrastructure Partners, neither it nor EACOP has confirmed reports that the pipeline is among the assets involved.

Downstream capacity is the next test, while environmental and commissioning risks remain

The trade-off between exporting crude and refining it at home is already part of the policy debate. In September, Museveni put the cost of moving crude through EACOP at $12.77 per barrel, arguing that domestic refining could cut both those pipeline charges and Uganda's roughly $2bn annual petroleum-import bill — though those are government projections, not realised savings.

The vehicle for that ambition is the separately planned 60,000-bpd Hoima refinery, a $4bn project with the UAE's Alpha MBM Investments holding 60% and UNOC 40%, intended to process part of Uganda's crude for domestic and regional markets. It remains pre-FID, leaving its eventual start-up date uncertain. Until it or comparable downstream capacity is running, Uganda will keep importing most of its fuel; a working refinery would retain more of the value chain at home and could in time supply neighbouring markets.

The environmental and social risks remain substantial, and the wider Lake Albert development has already drawn years of litigation and protest. Tilenga includes development inside Murchison Falls National Park, while critics of EACOP point to risks for wetlands, freshwater systems and protected habitats along the route, and to land-acquisition grievances that have reached courts in Europe.

The sponsors counter that the buried, insulated pipeline is designed to limit operational emissions and will run largely on regional electricity grids, supplemented by solar. Those are operator claims rather than settled findings, and a long record of timetable slippage is a reminder that commissioning and start-up risks have not gone away.

The first export cargo will solve Uganda's most immediate commercial problem — getting Lake Albert crude to market — and will start generating transit and equity income for Tanzania, strengthening Tanga's claim to become a regional energy node.

The larger economic test comes afterwards. Uganda will still import most of its refined fuel until downstream capacity is built, and Tanzania's energy hub remains largely on paper. EACOP gives Uganda the route it needs to monetise its oil; it does not, on its own, deliver the broader industrial and energy transformation that Kampala and Dar es Salaam envisage.

MUSCAT: Oman has cleared the way for one of its most significant stock market listings in recent years, with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) approving the prospectus for the initial public offering (IPO) of the Oman India Fertiliser Company (OMIFCO). The move enables the sale of a 25% stake in the company and its listing on the Muscat Stock Exchange.

The offering comprises 1.67 billion shares with a total value of approximately RO 260.9 million ($678 million). Subscription opens on June 16, 2026 and runs until June 25, 2026, with shares allocated 60% to institutional investors and 40% to individual investors.

The IPO is widely viewed as a landmark transaction for Oman’s capital markets, expected to enhance market depth, improve liquidity, and attract a broader base of regional and international investors. It also aligns with the Oman Investment Authority’s (OIA) divestment programme, which aims to monetise state-linked assets and redeploy capital into sectors supporting long-term economic diversification.

OMIFCO is a strategic Oman–India joint venture owned by OQ (50%), the Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative (IFFCO) (25%), and Krishak Bharati Cooperative (KRIBHCO) (25%). The company operates a large-scale ammonia–urea fertiliser complex in Sur Industrial City in Oman, comprising two ammonia and two urea production trains. The facility has an annual production capacity of about 1.15 million tonnes of ammonia and 1.65 million tonnes of granular urea, positioning it as one of Oman’s key export-oriented industrial assets with strong global fertiliser market exposure.

Institutional investors will subscribe at a price range of 146–156 baisa per share, while retail investors will participate at 156 baisa per share. Following listing, OMIFCO plans to adopt a semi-annual dividend policy, with distributions expected in April and September each year, subject to approvals.

The listing is expected to be closely watched by regional and international investors as a benchmark transaction for Oman’s ongoing capital market development and privatisation-linked equity offerings.