Peru’s Congress has appointed José María Balcázar Zelada, an 83-year-old legislator from Perú Libre, as interim president of the Republic until July 28 2026, following the censure of former head of state José Jerí. The decision, adopted in an extraordinary plenary session on February 18, places Balcázar at the helm of a country that has seen eight presidents in less than a decade, underscoring a prolonged period of institutional volatility. 

His appointment comes less than eight weeks before the April 12 general elections, compressing the distance between executive succession and a national vote that will define Peru’s next government.

The transition occurred after Jerí was removed by Congress on February 17, over alleged irregular contacts with Chinese business figures and reported favouritism in state contracts. For 24 hours, Peru formally lacked a president, as ministers remained in office with only administrative functions. Congress then proceeded to elect a new Speaker of the legislature, a position that, under constitutional succession rules, confers the presidency of the Republic.

Four candidates contested the post: María del Carmen Alva of Acción Popular, Héctor Acuña of Honor y Democracia, Edgar Reymundo of the Bloque Democrático Popular, and Balcázar. In the first round, Balcázar secured 46 votes against Alva’s 43, while none reached the required majority of 59 out of 117 valid votes. In the second ballot, he prevailed with 64 votes to Alva’s 46.

His victory was facilitated by support from left-wing groups and key centrist blocs, including Alianza para el Progreso and Podemos Perú. Sources cited by El Comercio indicated that negotiations included assurances regarding continuity in ministerial portfolios, notably Housing, Labour and the social security system EsSalud. 

Some reports also suggested that the possibility of a humanitarian pardon for former president Pedro Castillo was raised in discussions with sympathetic benches, though both Balcázar and Perú Libre’s spokesman Flavio Cruz later denied that such a measure was on the immediate agenda.

Castillo, who attempted to dissolve Congress on December 7 2022, was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 11 years and five months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to rebellion. In his first press conference as president, Balcázar stated that a pardon “is not on the agenda for the moment” and that the former president’s judicial process should continue in accordance with the law.

The political arithmetic behind Balcázar’s ascent has triggered recriminations among right-wing parties. Representatives of Renovación Popular accused Fuerza Popular of covertly backing the leftist candidate despite publicly endorsing Alva. Fuerza Popular officials rejected those claims, while party leader Keiko Fujimori described the outcome as “a sad day for the country”. Meanwhile, Avanza País attributed the result to strategic miscalculations by Renovación Popular’s leadership.

Beyond the parliamentary manoeuvring, Balcázar’s appointment has revived scrutiny of his professional record. Trained as a lawyer at the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo, where he graduated in 1972, he later earned a doctorate in law and political science in 2005. He served as a superior judge in Lambayeque and briefly as a provisional justice of the Supreme Court. However, in 2011 the National Council of the Magistracy determined that he did not meet the standards required for ratification in the judiciary.

According to reports, the Council cited two principal grounds. First, in 2004, while sitting on the Permanent Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, Balcázar annulled a cassation ruling that had already acquired the status of res judicata, an act deemed a serious breach of legal certainty and due process. 

Second, during a ratification interview, he was questioned about his reasoning in a case involving alleged financial operations linked to Vladimiro Montesinos, the former intelligence chief and close adviser to ex-president Alberto Fujimori. Montesinos was later convicted and sentenced to multiple prison terms for corruption, human rights abuses and running a vast bribery network during the 1990s, exposed through the so-called “vladivideos” scandal. 

The Council found “serious deficiencies” in his argumentative technique and concluded that he had not satisfied the behavioural and suitability requirements expected of a magistrate at that level. A subsequent appeal was rejected.

His tenure as dean of the Lambayeque Bar Association between 2019 and 2020 remains one of the most politically sensitive aspects of his background. Prosecutors allege that revenues that should have been deposited in the institution’s official account were instead channelled into personal bank accounts, generating significant discrepancies identified by forensic experts. 

The Public Prosecutor’s Office filed charges for alleged misappropriation and has sought civil reparation; proceedings remain ongoing. In December 2024, the Bar Association voted to expel him permanently following internal disciplinary findings. Separate proceedings include a civil damages order in a defamation case and an investigation concerning alleged omissions in sworn declarations before electoral authorities. Balcázar denies wrongdoing.

In April 2025, the Public Prosecutor’s Office filed a constitutional complaint against Balcázar and former Attorney General Patricia Benavides for alleged bribery linked to congressional proceedings. He has acknowledged forwarding a relative’s curriculum vitae to an adviser but denies any illicit exchange.

Controversy has also centred on his statements during the 2023 debate on legislation to prohibit child marriage. He notoriously argued that early sexual relations, provided they were consensual and non-violent, could benefit the “future psychological development” of girls, and defended the legality of marriage from the age of 14. The Ministry of Women publicly rejected his assertions. When questioned again in February 2026, he maintained that his remarks had been taken out of context and declined to apologise.

These elements now intersect with the electoral calendar. The April 12 general election is scheduled in less than two months, and recent national polling by Ipsos Perú shows a fragmented field, high levels of undecided voters and persistently low trust in Congress and political parties. No candidate has consolidated a dominant lead, and the top contenders remain clustered within narrow margins. In successive Ipsos surveys, insecurity, corruption and political instability rank among the principal concerns cited by respondents.

In that context, Balcázar’s interim presidency operates as more than a procedural bridge. First, it reinforces the narrative of institutional fragility. Another abrupt transition, including a 24-hour presidential vacuum, may strengthen candidates positioning themselves as guarantors of order and stability. 

Second, his affiliation with Perú Libre and the lingering symbolism of Pedro Castillo may reactivate polarisation between anti-Castillista and pro-Castillista segments, particularly in southern regions. Even without concrete steps toward a pardon, the mere possibility functions as a campaign variable.

Third, the corruption dimension carries electoral weight. Allegations stemming from the Lambayeque Bar Association and the constitutional complaint filed by prosecutors amplify a broader perception of systemic impropriety. Polling consistently indicates that corruption remains among the top perceived national problems. In a tightly contested race with a large undecided bloc, reputational spillovers from the interim presidency could marginally affect turnout or late decision-making.

At the same time, structural constraints limit the scope of immediate impact. Balcázar’s mandate lasts until July 28, and his constitutional role is primarily administrative. In his inaugural address, delivered in the Faustino Sánchez Carrión building in central Lima, he pledged to guarantee transparent elections, maintain macroeconomic stability and prioritise public security. He explicitly signalled continuity in economic management, an effort likely designed to reassure markets and moderate voters.

Unless a major judicial development, an executive decision on Castillo, or a macroeconomic shock occurs before April 12, the interim presidency is more likely to reinforce existing campaign narratives than to transform them. Yet in a race defined by extreme fragmentation and narrow margins, even marginal shifts can determine who advances to a second round.

Peru will therefore approach the April ballot under the shadow of another leadership change, with an interim president facing ongoing legal scrutiny and presiding over an electorate fatigued by instability. Whether his short tenure recedes into the background or becomes a focal point of mobilisation will depend less on formal powers than on the political events that unfold in the six weeks ahead.