The latest phone call between Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum and US President Donald Trump was not significant because of its duration or tone, but for what it revealed about the current balance of power in the bilateral relationship. The 15-minute exchange, confirmed by the Mexican government on January 12, functioned as an exercise in crisis containment rather than diplomacy in the conventional sense. 

According to the Mexican presidency, Trump again raised the possibility of direct US military involvement in Mexico’s fight against organised crime, an option the country explicitly rejected on constitutional and sovereignty grounds.

The episode must be understood within a broader strategic context. Since returning to the White House last year, Trump has ramped up his rhetoric around narcotics, singling out Mexican cartels as a direct national security threat to the United States. That framing hardened after the US military operation in Venezuela earlier this month, which resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro. 

The Venezuela operation has shifted perceptions in Mexico City from viewing Trump’s threats as rhetorical pressure to treating them as credible policy options, according to senior Mexican officials cited by The New York Times.

Against that backdrop, the phone call was less about persuasion than boundary-setting. Sheinbaum’s central objective was to eliminate ambiguity regarding US “assistance” on Mexican soil. She reiterated that cooperation was acceptable, intervention was not, and that any security collaboration must respect Mexico’s constitutional prohibition on foreign military operations. 

This position, she said, was acknowledged during the call, with no further insistence from Trump, as she publicly stated during her morning briefing.

Rather than engaging Trump on principles alone, Sheinbaum anchored her argument in data-backed operational outcomes. She cited a reduction of up to 50% in fentanyl crossings into the United States and a 43% decline in fentanyl-related deaths north of the border, figures she attributed to joint security efforts. 

She also highlighted a 40% reduction in homicides in Mexico since she took office, the dismantling of dozens of clandestine drug laboratories, and tens of thousands of arrests, data reiterated by El País.

A tactical calculation underpins this emphasis. Trump has repeatedly argued that Mexico is “captured” by organised crime and Sheinbaum is afraid of facing cartels, a claim he does not need to substantiate legally, only politically. In response, Mexico’s strategy has been to undermine the usefulness of that narrative by demonstrating measurable enforcement outcomes, even if those outcomes do not fully align with Trump’s preferred rhetoric of militarised escalation.

According to El País, senior Mexican officials privately describe this approach as “delivering the homework”: securing the northern border with 10,000 troops, expanding intelligence-sharing, extraditing high-value targets, and sharply reducing irregular migration flows. The broader objective is not limited to domestic security, but aims to remove any pretext for unilateral US action.

Venezuela as a warning signal

The discussion of Venezuela during the call underscored the depth of Mexico's concern. According to the presidency, Trump inquired directly about Mexico’s position on the US intervention and Maduro’s ouster. Sheinbaum responded by restating Mexico’s long-standing doctrine of non-intervention, rooted in its constitution. She condemned the operation without escalating the exchange, and the issue was dropped, according to her own account.

However, the Venezuelan precedent has had a profound impact on Mexican threat perception. US prosecutors have accused Maduro of narcoterrorism and explicitly linked his government to Mexican cartels, mentioning Mexico dozens of times in the indictment, according to The New York Times. 

Mexican officials are acutely sensitive to any narrative that associates their state with Venezuela’s legal or political situation, fearing it could be used to justify extraordinary measures.

Internal deliberations within Sheinbaum’s cabinet reflect this anxiety. While there is broad agreement on opposing US intervention, there is disagreement over how publicly confrontational Mexico should be.

Some officials worry that repeated condemnations of US actions could harden Washington’s stance during upcoming trade and tariff negotiations, including the high-stakes review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement later this year.

Publicly, US officials have struck a conciliatory tone. US ambassador to Mexico Ronald Johnson described the current relationship as the “most cooperative and mutually beneficial of recent decades” following the call between the two presidents, as stated in a public message. 

That assessment aligns with the operational reality: intelligence cooperation has expanded, arms trafficking is now a formal item on the bilateral agenda, and high-level meetings are continuing, according to Mexican government briefings reported by multiple outlets.

Yet analysts warn against overinterpreting diplomatic language. Guadalupe Correa Cabrera of George Mason University told DW that structural asymmetry leaves Mexico with limited leverage and that unilateral US actions, including targeted strikes or covert operations, cannot be ruled out.

Ulises Flores Llanos of FLACSO offered a more cautious assessment, telling DW that Trump’s confrontational rhetoric is often followed by negotiation, but still requires careful management.

The upcoming binational security meeting in Washington on January 22-23 will be a critical indicator. Mexican officials, including the foreign minister and the security secretary, are expected to present updated enforcement data and seek firm commitments against unilateral action. According to El Economista, the outcome will clarify whether the United States is prepared to operate within existing coordination mechanisms or intends to escalate demands and, potentially, take unilateral action.

Mexico’s current posture is best described as defensive pragmatism. Sheinbaum has avoided public confrontation, prioritised direct communication, and reinforced enforcement to buy diplomatic space. 

This strategy has temporarily reduced pressure, as reflected in the decline of Mexico-related rhetoric in US media following the call, a trend tracked internally by the Mexican government. 

But the margin for error is minimal. Trump’s willingness to weaponise security, trade, and legal narratives simultaneously means that Mexico’s compliance must be continuous, visible, and politically legible to Washington. In this environment, results are not merely policy outcomes; they are instruments of deterrence.

The 15-minute phone call did not resolve the underlying tension. It postponed it. What follows, not what was said, will determine whether containment remains viable or whether the relationship enters a phase of open coercion.