A recent attack by Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) on a Chinese restaurant in what was supposedly a secure district of the Afghan capital Kabul has dealt a significant image blow to the Taliban regime, in the process undermining its claims that it can guarantee the safety of foreign nationals and investors, a recent piece by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) says.

The January 10 suicide bombing targeted a restaurant in the Shahr-e-Naw district, a tightly guarded neighbourhood of the Afghan capital. Seven people were killed in the incident, including a Chinese Muslim co-owner of the restaurant while the remaining fatalities were reported at the time as Afghan nationals by Al Jazeera and other regional media. More than a dozen other people were injured in the explosion, among them a Chinese citizen.

ISKP soon after claimed responsibility, stating that Chinese nationals had been placed on its target list because of Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in the west of the country. The group said the bomber had waited for a large number of Chinese diners to gather before detonating his explosives as Chinese nationals working in Kabul were known to frequent the restaurant.

ISKP has made a point of targeting China in both propaganda and operations for several years, in particular condemning its policies in Xinjiang in an effort to attract Uyghur recruits. Because of this, the group has previously attacked Chinese nationals and interests abroad, including the kidnapping and murder of two Chinese teachers in Quetta, Pakistan, in 2017.

In Afghanistan, it also carried out a suicide bombing outside the Foreign Ministry in January 2022 just prior to a visit by a Chinese delegation. An assault on the Kabul Longan Hotel, in December 2022 injured at least five Chinese and one Chinese mining worker was killed in Takhar in January 2025.

Chinese nationals working just over the border in Tajikistan’s mining sector have also been targeted although responsibility for some of the attacks remains unclear.

According to CACI, since the Taliban seized power in August 2021, China’s footprint in Afghanistan has expanded exponentially, particularly in the minerals sector. In part this is the result of investment from Beijing providing Afghanistan with all-important funding and a degree of political backing.

To this end, ISKP’s targeting of Chinese nationals clearly appears intended to strain ties between Beijing and the ruling Taliban, a declared adversary, while also working to discourage further Chinese engagement in the country.

United Nations reporting in the last year indicates that ISKP attacks had declined in frequency and scale, however, with propaganda output also diminishing. As such, the January 19 bombing in Kabul, followed soon after by the attack on a Shia mosque in Islamabad on February 6, may have been designed to signal continued relevance in the region, and although both attacks were aimed at what might be deemed soft targets, the ability to hit a Chinese-linked venue in Shahr-e-Naw show the group still retains some degree of effectiveness in the capital.

For Beijing though, the security breach in an area reportedly guarded by Chinese personnel will raise concerns even if Chinese casualties were limited. In the short-term though, China is unlikely to withdraw in any way from Afghanistan, especially as other countries are exploring a greater role in the country, including India.

As such, even for ISKP the attack offers mixed results, given that the number of Chinese casualties was limited. The bombing therefore does not necessarily signal a revival of ISKP’s capabilities, but while it does reinvigorate its profile, it serves to undermine the Taliban’s credibility and complicates relations with its most significant international partner.

Only by way of a sustained pattern of similar attacks, particularly against seemingly secure Chinese targets or major infrastructure would Beijing even consider reassessing the pace and scale of its investments.