The question not yet asked in all the confusion over the outbreak of hostilities on multiple fronts in the Middle East is whether or not the tangled web of historic rivalries that makes up the region could yet slip into an all-out Sunni–Shia war?

At present, the short answer appears to be that the region’s oldest fault line is being revived, but on Day 4 of missile exchanges and targeting tankers, it remains far from a clear‑cut sectarian battlefield.

What is playing out though is a dangerous blend of sectarian identities and wider regional alliance politics that could resemble a Sunni‑Shia axis if the conflict escalates further.

For decades, the gulf between Shia‑majority Iran and a cluster of Sunni‑dominated states, especially in the Gulf has been a slow-burning proxy‑inflected rivalry. Riyadh and Tehran have never been in a one-on-one war, but their networks of militias and political influence has long made the region appear like a chessboard of competing sectarian kingdoms. That dynamic has floated just below the surface of Middle East politics since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. But now, the current conflict is bringing the possibility of a full-on Sunni VS Shia flashpoint to the fore.

With the fault lines sharpened, the confrontation as it is playing out between the US and Israeli-led West and Iran has pulled a number of governments around the wider Middle East into positions of choice and solidarity like never before.

Dividing lines

Saudi Arabia – overwhelmingly Sunni – on March 1 summoned Iran’s ambassador in protest over Tehran’s attacks on its territory. Along with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE as well as Jordan - all Sunni – have found themselves dealing with Iran’s military aggression to differing degrees in the past few days.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) – another Sunni-majority nation – has seen more than its share of Iranian missiles and drones fired toward UAE territory. These have made headlines around the world as a result of the UAE’s now shattered image of being a safe haven for rich expats. Areas around Abu Dhabi and Dubai have been hit, and UAE air defences have intercepted large numbers of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, though debris has caused civilian casualties and substantial property damage.

Kuwait, Sunni to the tune of 70% or so, has also seen Iranian strikes at the Ali al‑Salem Air Base and Kuwait International Airport. There are also reports that drones have struck US military facilities in the country.

Qatar too – 90% Sunni with only a tiny Shia minority – is a lynchpin in global energy supplies and has been the victim of multiple Iranian air attacks. These are reported to include missiles and drone strikes targeting facilities including the Al Udeid Air Base and civilian infrastructure.

To the west on the border with Israel, Jordan as a signatory of a recent joint international statement, with other Gulf states and the US condemning Iran’s actions in calling for de‑escalation, has been intercepting missiles headed to air bases including Muwaffaq al‑Salti – at present home to a large number of US combat aircraft including F-15s.

The nation’s two predominantly Shia nations meanwhile are are also seeing their share of trouble. Bahrain has seen numerous Iranian missiles reported near or over Bahraini territory. As home to the US Fifth Fleet base in Manama, this was an inevitability, but the derogatory manner in which state-backed nationalist Iranian media has referred to Bahrain in recent months by claiming the country should be ruled from Tehran, is an indication of Iran's view of the Kingdom. It is a view which, in 1957, saw Tehran claim Bahrain as its 14^th province prior to eventual recognition of its independence in the early 1970s, following a period of international pressure.

To the northwest, Iraq, and in particular the Iraqi Kurdistan region, has been on the receiving end of missile and drone volleys near Erbil in the north of the country as well as around US bases. This is likely no coincidence given that most Kurds are Sunni Muslims and that Kurds in Iran have long faced discrimination and unequal treatment by the Iranian state.

Even Afghanistan to the east of Iran, while sympathetic to Tehran and not 'yet' involved in the ongoing conflict based is between 85 and 90% Sunni.

Sectarian or coincidence?

For outsiders and many observers, what we’re seeing feels like a Sunni–Shia confrontation – of Iran’s making, intentional or otherwise.

The imagery writes itself with a Shia-dominated nation and its network of terrorist proxies facing off against multiple regional Sunni governments that just happen to be backed by Washington and Jerusalem.

But looking at the issue in simple black and white terms risks missing vital nuance.

Predominantly Sunni states in the Gulf should in no way be deemed puppets of the West regardless of any unspoken Iranian beliefs that may emerge to this end. Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha all have their own priorities that more often than nor fail to perfectly align with either Washington or Jerusalem.

The wider public and political elites in these states, as do billions around the world, likely view Iran through a prism of security issues, energy politics and even historical prestige, just as much as they may see Israel at least partially through the lens of Palestinian and Arab identity.

To this end, while the conflict appears sectarian on the surface there are multiple layers of socio and geopolitical nuance below that cannot be ignored. One of the most dangerous is the existence of Iran’s network of Shia militias and allied armed groups of which Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most prominent. That they are already involved in moves against Israel is concerning. Should other Iran-backed militia, of which there are between five and ten active, pop up in any way elsewhere in the Gulf region, that concern could switch to alarm.

As such, while the risk is very real that this war may turn full-on sectarian should the actors involved align further with historic Sunni or Shia identities, we are not there yet. However, should the region’s Gulf states lean more visibly into support for Israel or the US campaign as a result of constant Iranian missile and drone attacks, or even Iran-linked militia activity, the perception of a Sunni‑Shia war could harden into reality whereby Sunni versus Shia symbolism would no longer just be theoretically superimposed onto geopolitical conflict – it could be acted upon.