Expectations that 2026 could prove decisive in ending the war in Ukraine are premature and risk misreading the logic driving Moscow, argues Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and founder of political analysis firm R.Politik, in a comment for Carnegie Politika.

With Russia under mounting sanctions pressure and Ukraine’s energy infrastructure strained, renewed contacts in Abu Dhabi and Geneva on February 17–18 have fuelled cautious optimism. Yet “real progress toward peace may look entirely possible,” Stanovaya says, but the conditions instead risk ensnaring all sides in separate traps.

For Kyiv, “the overwhelming priority is to force Russia to cease hostilities,” she argues, leaving only the question of “what price Kyiv is willing to pay for this in terms of territory and security guarantees.” Ukraine maintains that territorial questions should be determined by the front line at the end of fighting. Moscow’s demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the Donbas before full peace talks begin is “unrealistic—at least under Ukraine’s current political conditions.” But Russia believes it can eventually seize the region militarily and “sees no point in compromising.”

The danger for Kyiv is becoming mired in drawn-out ceasefire talks while Russia continues striking infrastructure. “To feign goodwill, the Kremlin may periodically agree to brief ceasefires,” she says. A durable halt to hostilities would come only as part of a settlement on Moscow’s terms, including an end to Western military assistance.

Russia faces its own dilemma. If it forces Kyiv into substantive negotiations resembling the failed Istanbul talks of 2022, the Kremlin must clarify which demands it is prepared to enforce. The war’s aims extend beyond territory. Moscow seeks a Ukraine firmly within its sphere of influence, with political restrictions that would curb nationalism, entrench pro-Russian forces, protect the Russian language and restore the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In essence, Russia wants Ukraine to commit to being a “friendly” state, backed by cuts to its armed forces, an end to NATO partnerships and a ban on Western military infrastructure. The return of Vladimir Medinsky to the talks signals that such political demands are again central. Moscow is “clearly counting on Washington to help it impose such conditions on Kyiv,” Stanovaya says.

The final trap is that faced by Europe. European leaders have been calling for a restart of dialogue with Moscow as the situation in Ukraine worsens and the cost to Brussels escalates. French President Emmanuel Macron is preparing for a one-on-one meeting with Putin although it is unclear what he hopes to achieve. But Russia will seek genuine rapprochement only if Europe is prepared to discuss strategic security issues, something that the EU has shown little appetite for.

“Moscow will likely demand an end to military support for Ukraine. The bitter truth is that Europe is neither prepared to fight Russia, nor engage in what the Kremlin considers a meaningful discussion about the future European security architecture. Accordingly, Europe will remain on the periphery of the negotiating process—as an indirect target for Russia standing behind an embattled Ukraine,” says Stanovaya.

As a result a signed deal could prove hollow. Any agreement forced on Ukraine would likely meet the fate of the Minsk accords: “Instead of implementation, the agreements will be sabotaged and a gradual slide toward further escalation will begin.” That instability would create risks for the US as mediator and leave Europe marginalised unless it engages on strategic security questions.

“There’s little room for optimism,” she concludes. For the Kremlin, the conflict is existential — a confrontation with the West on Ukrainian soil. “The main source of Russian aggression is a profound mistrust of the West and the firm belief that it intends to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia. As long as this fear persists … the war will not end.”