Beijing and Hanoi are stepping up co-operation centred on internal security, in the process offering a preview of how China may deepen ties across south-east Asia despite longstanding differences with several countries in the region.

Vietnam’s President and Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm’s recent four day state visit was his first since taking office; a visit that highlights China’s prominence in Hanoi’s policymaking under Lâm, with a shared emphasis on party-led governance coupled to economic development and public security. It came on the back of a March meeting between Chinese and Vietnamese defence, public security and foreign affairs officials in Hanoi as reported by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the later talks in the Chinese capital covering topics from energy, infrastructure, trade and science to technology, as Vietnam seeks to ease its own energy shortages and manufacturing sector strains.

The so-called “3+3” framework - a ministerial-level dialogue mechanism between countries that brings together three key policy areas on each side – saw foreign affairs, defence and public (internal) security top the bill. For China, this is all about embedding internal security issues such as policing and regime stability into foreign policy while promoting domestic stability as underpinning economic development which in turn helps to create a tighter, more centralised form of co-operation with global partners.

To this end, Beijing is increasingly elevating its internal security apparatus in diplomacy. The Ministry of Public Security and the Communist party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission are playing a larger role in shaping law enforcement co-operation and capacity-building with counterparts overseas. This approach positions China as a beacon of political stability and steady predictability, in direct contrast to the unpredictable nature of recent US politics under Donald Trump – a factor Beijing is likely hoping will influence China's future bilateral engagement with Asian partners.

Set against ongoing global disruptions, including the early 2026 US military actions against Venezuela and the conflict in Iran, China is now working to advance a governance model centred on internal stability.

The “3+3” mechanism was first held at the ministerial level during Xi’s visit to south-east Asia in April 2025, and came with a call for deeper political, security and practical co-operation. At the March 2026 meeting in the Vietnamese capital meanwhile, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi emphasised joint efforts to safeguard political system security, with both sides backing each other’s initiatives domestically and in forums including ASEAN as well as the Lancang-Mekong framework and Brics.

At the same meeting, defence ministers discussed expanding military co-operation, including border and maritime stability, while managing disputes in the South China Sea through negotiation; China and Vietnam both making claims and counter claims to remote atolls in the region.

Public security too was a prominent pillar of China’s engagement in March and on the back of the “3+3” talks, the two countries held their ninth ministerial conference on crime prevention. At the conference Chinese public security minister Wang Xiaohong prioritised political security as discussions with his Vietnamese counterpart Lương Tam Quang covered issues including cybersecurity, telecom fraud, online gambling, drug control and fugitive repatriation.

At a subsequent bilateral meeting, Wang also reiterated plans to strengthen co-operation against terrorism and fraud - at a future meeting to be hosted in China.

In similar form, across the Southeast Asia region, an area of particular focus under the Global Security Initiative, China is now working to expand police and non-military security ties. These efforts are centred on the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum and regional mechanisms such as the Lancang-Mekong law enforcement centre – put together to co-ordinate efforts against transnational crime, including cyber fraud and human trafficking.

As such, future participation in the “3+3” framework by any regional governments will be seen as accepting China’s governance model linking internal security with development. Vietnam, with its own Communist political system similar to that found in China was the natural starting point and if proven successful will likely be extended to China-friendly countries such as Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia and even Thailand.