China may import more oil from Iran than the US, but it is less exposed to a global oil disruption than the US thanks to its low use intensity.

Following the lock down of the Straits by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on March 2 tariff through the narrow waterway has ground to a complete halt, threatening to spike prices and spark a global energy crisis.

A familiar narrative has resurfaced: that China’s economy is acutely vulnerable to any disruption in Iranian oil flows as last year Iran was the second largest supplier (1.4mbpd) after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1.5mbpd). However, while an important source of oil, Iran only accounted for 17% of China’s total oil imports in 2025.

Citing recent data on Asian oil flows, political commentator and bne IntelliNews columnist Arnaud Bertrand, argues that China is “actually not very reliant on oil travelling through the Strait of Hormuz” when compared with other economies in the region, particularly US allies. “Japan for instance depends on it for an incredible 91% of its oil imports and the Philippines 94%.”

Beijing’s purported exposure obscures a more uneven regional picture. While Japan and the Philippines source the overwhelming majority of their crude imports through the narrow waterway, China’s supply routes and domestic production base make it less directly dependent on that chokepoint.

“First of all people don’t realise China is very self-reliant when it comes to energy, especially with their massive green energy buildup,” Bertrand says. He points to an energy self-sufficiency rate that “hit 84.6% last year”, reflecting both domestic fossil fuel output and rapid expansion in renewables.

China has emerged as the global green energy champion and invested heavily in solar, wind and hydroelectric capacity over the past decade. Those investments are now paying dividends as the world walks into yet another energy crisis. The result, Bertrand argues, is an economy in which imports account for a relatively modest share of total primary energy consumption.

Beijing has also been careful to diversify its oil imports. “Iran constitutes 17% of China’s oil imports — less than Saudi Arabia,” he says. Oil itself, he adds, “represents roughly 59% of China’s energy imports by energy content” when volumes are converted into standard coal equivalent.

Taken together, these ratios suggest that even a complete loss of Iranian crude would have a limited impact on China’s overall energy balance. “When you do the math, given that Iran is 17% of China’s oil imports → oil is 59% of China’s energy imports → energy imports are 15.4% of China’s total energy consumption, this means that China depends on Iran for roughly 1.5% of its energy,” Bertrand says.

“In other words, almost a rounding error for a country that’s increasing its own primary energy production by 4.6% a year,” he adds, citing sectoral statistics for 2024. “They could replace Iran entirely in four months by simply doing more of the same.”

Such claims rest on the assumption that domestic production growth can be sustained and that alternative suppliers would be willing and able to fill any shortfall. The calculation highlights the distinction between headline oil import figures and the broader energy system into which they feed.

In parallel, it has been widely argued that the Trump administration is specifically and actively seeking to curtail China’s access to energy supplies. The decapitation of Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela is seen as partly an attempt to cut China off from those oil exports, as China is also a major buyer of Venezuelan oil.

“This all assumes that there is some sort of strategy by the US to cut off China’s energy supplies, when little suggests this,” he says.

Recent remarks by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright following moves by Washington to assert control over Venezuelan oil flows where Wright “admitted that they’re principally selling it to… China,” Bertrand notes, suggesting that commercial logic continues to shape trade patterns despite geopolitical rivalry.

The implication, in Bertrand’s account, is that energy markets remain more pragmatic than political rhetoric might imply. Even amid sanctions and strategic competition, crude flows are often redirected rather than eliminated, and buyers and sellers adapt to new constraints.

That does not mean that a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be inconsequential. The waterway remains a vital artery for global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments, and any sustained disruption would reverberate through prices and supply chains. For countries such as Japan and the Philippines, the dependence is stark.