Is Aleksandar Vučić finally running out of road? In Serbia, it is the question that follows every large protest.

The latest demonstration in Belgrade has lent it new force. Tens of thousands flooded the capital on the weekend, filling the city’s busiest roundabout and all roads leading off it. An independent monitor put turnout at 180,000-190,000. Officials insist it was far smaller; pro-government tabloids tried to say that only a few thousand attended. Images and drone footage suggest another massive mobilisation.

Clashes broke out near parliament after the rally, as has often followed largely peaceful gatherings. A heavy police presence faced off with groups of violent demonstrators. The violence allowed both sides to harden their narratives: the government blamed organisers; student protest leaders pointed to state-backed provocateurs. Speaking from Beijing two days later, Vučić dismissed the crowd estimates as “incredible nonsense”. Yet mass turnout at protests, combined with weaker polling and narrowing election margins, is harder to brush aside. 

This is no isolated outburst. The protests are part of a movement that began after the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people. For student organisers and opponents of the regime, the tragedy exposed systemic corruption public infrastructure projects. The government disputes this, pointing to arrests and resignations in the wake of the collapse. But nearly two years on, demonstrations and road blockades continue, organised by the 'Students in Blockade'.

The movement’s strength has also been its weakness. It is deliberately broad—uniting disparate groups in opposition to the government rather than around a shared political programme. Its slogans are simple: against corruption, against violence, against Vučić. But, as of yet, there is no leader, no clear policy platform. The “student list” that will fight the next elections remains ill-defined.

Nor is Belgrade the whole of Serbia. The capital has long been more liberal and more hostile to the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Large crowds there do not necessarily signal a nationwide shift. In smaller towns and rural areas, where the SNS is strongest, the picture differs: state-aligned television dominates and independent media are less accessible. Protesters are often portrayed as violent or foreign-backed mercenaries.

Still, students have begun organising beyond urban centres as part of 'A student in every village campaign', making some inroads. Local elections in March delivered victories for the SNS and its allies in all municipalities contested — but with reduced margins in most. Despite the ruling party’s formidable electoral machinery, student-backed lists finished a close second in many places, sometimes within a few percentage points.

In Aranđelovac, the gap narrowed to little more than 1,000 votes; in Kula, the result hinged on a few hundred ballots. This was despite widespread reports of irregularities, including intimidation of opposition, journalists and election observers. CRTA documented pressure on voters and violence around polling stations. Masked men armed with sticks were seen chasing citizens—incidents reframed by officials and pro-government media as the fault of 'blockaders'. 

Polling tells a similar story of gradual decline in government support. The most recent survey by Faktor Plus, published in April 2026, still puts the SNS ahead, at roughly 46%. But the loosely defined “student list” already attracts close to 29% — despite lacking leadership, candidates or a precise policy programme. 

Meanwhile, scandals continue to chip away at confidence in state institutions. A recent killing linked to organised crime, followed by the arrest of a senior police official on suspicion that he tried to cover up the murder, has reinforced perceptions of blurred lines between the state and the underworld. 

For more than a decade, Vučić has managed such pressures adeptly, calling snap elections at moments of strength and renewing his mandate. He has also presided over relative macroeconomic stability — steady growth, rising wages and strong investment — which underpins his appeal. Serbia is far from crisis point.

Nor does the current moment resemble the chaotic years preceding the fall of Slobodan Milošević. The government is deeply unpopular among some groups, but others credit it with improving living standards. Internationally, Serbia remains buffered by cautious Western engagement, even as Vučić balances relations with the EU, Russia and China.

Yet the political calculus may be shifting. The president has said early elections could be held between late September and mid-November. Once routine, such a move now looks riskier. Narrower margins and sustained protests point to a more competitive environment; delay may prove tempting for a president due to leave office next year.

Even so, elections may not resolve the underlying problem. The protest movement has yet to convert its energy into a viable political force. Its emphasis on broad mobilisation rather than a defined ideological alternative to the SNS is both its strength and a constraint. The pro-European opposition remains disorganised, and many dissatisfied voters are not yet convinced there is an alternative.