Hungary’s political landscape changed decisively this week as Peter Magyar formally took office on May 12, completing the fastest government formation since the country’s democratic transition. Just 30 days after his landslide election victory, the leader of the centre-right Tisza Party unveiled his cabinet and pledged to dismantle what he called the institutional and financial legacy of the 16-year rule of Viktor Orban.

The speed of the transition is itself symbolic. Magyar has sought to project urgency from his first day in office, arguing that the state he inherited is not simply economically weakened but institutionally hollowed out by years of centralised rule, political patronage and what his government describes as systemic corruption. His administration’s early messaging suggests that, beyond restoring relations with Brussels, its defining mission will be a domestic reckoning: tracing public wealth siphoned off during the Orban years and reasserting legal oversight over institutions that critics say were subordinated to party control.

The new prime minister’s first speech to parliament was framed as a declaration of institutional reconstruction. Rebuilding the rule of law, restoring checks and balances and depoliticising state institutions were his stated priorities. That signals a sharp break with the Orban era, during which Hungary became the European Union’s most contentious member state over rule-of-law disputes, judicial independence and media freedom.

Magyar inherits a commanding parliamentary majority. Tisza’s 53.2% vote share translated into 141 seats, exceeding even the supermajorities once enjoyed by Fidesz. That gives the new government an unusual amount of room to legislate quickly, and it has signalled it intends to use that power immediately.

At the centre of the new administration is the Prime Minister’s Office, which Magyar described as the future “streamlined brain” of the state. It will be headed by Balint Ruff, a political scientist and campaign strategist who has become one of the key architects of Tisza’s transition. Ruff used his parliamentary hearing to promise what he called “the greatest ever economic and political reckoning”, including the most extensive audit of state finances since 1989.

He estimated that as much as HUF20 trillion (€56bn) in public assets may have been diverted or misused over the past 16 years. Whether that figure proves politically rhetorical or legally actionable, it signals the scale of the confrontation ahead. From July, a new National Asset Recovery and Protection Office will begin operations, with powers to investigate state contracts, trace ownership structures and pursue the recovery of public funds allegedly channelled through politically connected networks.

This anti-corruption drive is not only aimed at domestic institutions. The government’s focus extends to Hungarian-linked investments and strategic partnerships across the western Balkans, where Orban cultivated close personal alliances with leaders often criticised by Brussels for democratic backsliding.

In the days leading up to the inauguration, Magyar and several incoming ministers toured government buildings in Budapest’s Castle District, livestreaming the visits on social media. More than 100,000 people watched as the new prime minister pointed to lavish interiors in ministries previously occupied by senior Fidesz officials: cigar rooms, art collections, designer furnishings and private terraces overlooking the Danube.

The images were carefully curated to reinforce Tisza’s core campaign narrative: that a narrow elite had insulated itself in luxury while public services deteriorated. Magyar contrasted these offices with crumbling hospitals, underfunded schools and child protection institutions. In political terms, the spectacle served as a visual indictment of the previous regime and a preview of the investigations to come.

The government’s first actions suggest those investigations will be broad. Magyar has ordered an immediate audit of all ministries and state-owned enterprises, alongside a freeze on non-essential public payments and contractual commitments until a review is completed. Healthcare, education, justice and finance have been designated priority ministries, each granted enhanced veto powers in cabinet decisions — a sign of the administration’s focus on repairing institutions rather than launching headline spending programmes.

Yet while the domestic clean-up dominates the agenda, foreign policy may prove equally consequential. Magyar has made clear that Hungary will seek to repair relations with the European Union and re-anchor itself firmly in Western alliances. That shift is expected to unlock billions of euros in suspended EU recovery funds, frozen under the previous government amid concerns over judicial independence and corruption.

Polling by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) suggests the Hungarian public broadly supports that reset. Nearly 80% of respondents expect relations with Brussels to improve under Magyar, and strong majorities favour a more explicitly European foreign policy. But the same research indicates that voters did not elect Tisza primarily for geopolitical reasons. Most backed the party as a vehicle for change at home — a rejection of corruption, stagnation and the erosion of public services — rather than an endorsement of a new foreign-policy doctrine.

Hungarians appear to want renewed access to Europe and its funds, but not necessarily a dramatic rupture with Russia. Support for improving ties with Ukraine exists, but majorities remain opposed to direct military aid and sceptical of Kyiv’s eventual EU accession. Magyar’s campaign pledge to hold a referendum on Ukraine’s membership reflects that caution. The electorate’s foreign-policy instinct remains transactional: what serves Hungary’s economic interest, rather than Europe’s broader strategic goals.

This inward-looking pragmatism also shapes the government’s stance toward the Western Balkans, where Orban built a network of political alliances. Among the most significant is Serbia, whose President Aleksandar Vucic enjoyed one of the closest relationships with Orban among regional leaders.

For Belgrade, the change in Budapest raises practical as well as diplomatic questions. The flagship Belgrade–Budapest railway — a Chinese-backed infrastructure project linking the two capitals — may face delays as Hungarian authorities review procurement contracts signed under the previous government. The line was one of Orban’s showcase regional investments and a key symbol of Hungary’s eastern opening strategy.

Energy ties are under even greater scrutiny. The proposed sale of a controlling Russian stake in Serbia’s oil company NISto MOL Group is now uncertain. The transaction was driven partly by US sanctions requiring Russian capital to exit NIS, but it relied heavily on the personal relationship between Orban and Vucic. Magyar’s pivot back toward Brussels and his tougher stance on opaque strategic deals could complicate approval. The broader plan for a joint oil pipeline between the two countries may also be reassessed.

In Bosnia & Herzegovina, Orban was one of the strongest external backers of former Republika Srpska president Milorad Dodik, and supported investment projects in the Serb entity, including a controversial lithium mining venture near Lopare. That project, promoted by Swiss and German firms with Hungarian political support, now reportedly faces growing uncertainty as Magyar distances Budapest from his predecessor’s regional alliances. Without Hungarian state-linked financing or diplomatic advocacy in Brussels, investors may struggle to advance the project amid strong local environmental opposition.

This regional reassessment matters because Orban’s foreign policy was not merely ideological; it was commercial. Hungarian state-linked companies and politically connected investors expanded into Serbia and Bosnia through infrastructure, energy and extractive projects that often blended business with diplomacy. By promising audits of past state deals, Magyar may open a broader examination of how Hungarian capital was deployed abroad.

That makes the anti-corruption campaign potentially transnational. The new administration’s language suggests it sees the Orban era not just as a domestic governance problem but as a system that linked state resources, business interests and political alliances across Central and Southeast Europe.