Alliances usually form against an enemy that has attacked a country, or that's how they used to work. However, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on August 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, took shape amid the fallout of a war in which Iran is the principal target. What makes the meetings even more bizarre is that Iran appears to be on the cusp of joining the grouping. 

President Masoud Pezeshkian said on October 17 that Iran is willing to join the alliance, drawing a mix of guffaws and confusion. On October 26, Saudi, Pakistani, and Turkish officials met Iran's security chief, according to Iranian officials, putting to rest the idea of a flurry of Persian confusion. No terms have been announced, and no agreement exists. The idea still deserves attention, because every party has reasons to want it and reasons to fear it.

The text of the pact makes the arithmetic awkward, since it treats an attack on one member as an attack on all, which would bind Turkey, a Nato member, and nuclear-armed Pakistan to regard an American or Israeli strike on Tehran as an attack on themselves. Neither capital is likely to sign that, so the more plausible outcome is a lesser instrument, such as an associate status or a non-aggression undertaking, that gives Tehran a place at the table without a guarantee.

Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in 2023 in a deal brokered by China, an arrangement that the war has tested ever since, and the Saudi-Pakistan accord of September 2025 had widened into the Mecca pact within a year, as IntelliNews reported. A third widening, to include the war's target that shaped the first two, would be the quickest turn in the region's recent diplomacy.

Riyadh has the clearest reason to talk, with its crude exports running about 74% below the pre-war baseline in August, a commodities newsletter, and the Strait of Hormuz open to fewer than 10 vessels a day. The 746-mile East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea was meant to be the answer, until the Houthis entered the war in mid-July and claimed a strike on an Aramco facility there on September 16.

Air defence has not stopped the Houthis, a Yemeni movement aligned with Iran, but a Saudi-Iranian understanding that covered the Red Sea might, and it would be worth more to Riyadh than another battery of interceptors.

Tehran has an equally clear interest, having been at war with the US and Israel since February with few friends who control oil terminals, and a seat beside Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad would make it harder for Washington to treat the kingdom as a platform at a cost to Iran of nothing more than an offer.

Pakistan and Turkey carry the greatest risk because both border Iran and both would pay first if talks collapsed into a quarrel inside the pact. Any new member would presumably need the consent of all three founders, giving each a veto and Ankara and Islamabad a reason to prefer the slow track.

The three governments that drew up the pact hold different views of Iran, with Turkey buying its gas and Saudi Arabia coming under fire from its allies in Yemen. A unanimous decision is possible, but the text would have to be very short.

Egypt offers a small test of Saudi intentions, since Riyadh kept Cairo out of the pact in August, citing Saudi sources who pointed to friction with Egypt, and admitting Iran while excluding Egypt would be an odd order of precedence that Cairo would notice.

Oil markets would react before the diplomats did, because Hormuz carried a large share of the world's seaborne crude before the war and the East-West pipeline was only ever a partial substitute. Even a partial reopening would ease pressure on Brent and on Asian buyers of Saudi crude, some of which now wait up to 49 days for cargoes rerouted through Egypt instead of 21, and Saudi Arabia would earn more on every barrel that it sells.

Washington and Jerusalem would read any deal as a hedge by Riyadh, and they would be right, since the kingdom has relied on American protection for decades and the Mecca pact already shows that it wants a second source at a lower cost than a refinery fire.

Paper has a short shelf life in this war, as the memorandum signed in Islamabad in June, which did not survive the summer, showed, and a Mecca arrangement with Iran would face the same odds unless it changes what happens at sea. If Houthi fire at Yanbu stops, the talks are real; if ships stay away from Hormuz, they are theatre.