Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán conceded defeat in the April 12 election, in what looks like a potential turning point not only for Hungary’s domestic politics but also for  leaders across Southeast Europe who have aligned themselves with his brand of illiberal governance.

Preliminary results showed the opposition Tisza Party, led by Peter Magyar, on course for a commanding parliamentary majority. With just over half the votes processed, projections indicated Tisza could secure 136 seats, enough for a supermajority, while Orbán’s ruling Fidesz trailed with just 56.

Magyar confirmed Orbán had acknowledged defeat, writing on Facebook that the prime minister had congratulated “our victory”. Orbán, addressing supporters along the Danube, described the outcome as a “painful and clear” result, while avoiding any direct reference to his opponent or the Tisza Party.

“Regardless of the outcome, we will continue to serve the nation,” Orbán said, pledging that Fidesz would “not abandon its supporters” and would instead focus on “recovery and rebuilding the political community” from the opposition benches. He also extended thanks to ethnic Hungarians beyond Hungary’s borders, signalling continuity in Budapest’s outreach to diaspora communities.

The result is the most significant political setback for Orbán since his return to power in 2010, and raises immediate questions about the future of a regional network of leaders and parties who have drawn ideological and, in some cases, material support from Budapest.

A regional project under strain

Over the past decade, Orbán has cultivated close ties with like-minded figures across the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, positioning Hungary as a patron of conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic forces in countries aspiring to join the European Union.

These relationships include Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, leaders of North Macedonia’s VMRO-DPMNE party and Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream movement.

With the defeat of Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party in 2023, Orbán had already lost a key ally inside the EU. In response, he intensified engagement with candidate countries, seeking to build a bloc of future member states sympathetic to his vision of a more sovereign, less liberal Europe.

The strategy amounted to a long-term bet: that by supporting leaders in accession countries — politically, economically and diplomatically — Hungary could help shape the EU’s internal balance of power once those states joined.

This has included Hungarian backing Serbia’s infrastructure and energy sectors, including an oil pipeline, and emerged as one of Belgrade’s top trade partners. Orbán also consistently supported Serbia’s EU accession bid while opposing membership for Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, in international institutions.

In Bosnia, Budapest provided financial backing to Republika Srpska after Germany suspended funding in protest at Dodik’s secessionist rhetoric. Hungarian officials also resisted international pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership, even as tensions rose over the future of the fragile state.

Orbán’s government similarly maintained close ties with Georgia’s ruling party, despite widespread criticism of the 2024 general election there, and offered political protection to former North Macedonian prime minister Nikola Gruevski, who was granted asylum in Hungary after fleeing a prison sentence at home.

Critics have long argued that Orbán’s external alliances mirrored his domestic policies, accusing him of encouraging democratic backsliding among partners. His October 2024 visit to Tbilisi, days after the disputed election, for example, was widely seen as endorsing a contested result.

Serbia recalibrates

Among Orbán’s closest regional allies, Vučić moved quickly to strike a conciliatory tone with the likely new prime minister of Serbia’s neighbour.

“Congratulations to Peter Magyar on his electoral victory. I am confident that the strong cooperation between Hungary and Serbia will continue to grow,” Vučić wrote on X, adding that he was “also grateful to Viktor Orbán for helping make such relations possible”.

Serbia’s tabloid and pro-government media were far less diplomatic. Notorious tabloid Informer warned of dire consequences following Orban’s defeat, while Politika framed the outcome as the result of Western meddling and said it would accelerate Europe’s “collapse,” citing Russian official Kirill Dmitriev. 

The result has prompted comparisons with Serbia’s political landscape, where Vucic has been in power for over a decade. Magyar has also drawn links, visiting Novi Sad in 2025 to criticise Vucic as Orban’s ally, while backing anti-corruption protests and advocating faster EU accession for Serbia.

The president of the Freedom and Justice Party (SSP), Dragan Đilas, congratulated Magyar and expressed hope that "freedom will soon come to Serbia."  The President of the People's Movement of Serbia, Miroslav Aleksić, said the results showed that it is possible to defeat an authoritarian ruler.

Pro-government voices, however, reject parallels. Politika argued Serbia had already avoided a “Hungarian scenario” during last year’s protests. There are certainly major differences: Serbia lacks a clear political alternative to the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), while public attitudes diverge — Hungary’s electorate is broadly more anti-Russian due to its Soviet past, whereas Serbia’s is more pro-Russian and ambivalent towards the EU.

“The trouble with repeating the success of the Hungarian opposition in Serbia, as some suggest may now occur, is that the Hungarian electorate is significantly more liberal (and has been for decades) than Serbia’s,” wrote analyst Jasmin Mujanović on X.

“Orbán’s pro-Russian views were something he imposed on Hungarians. In Serbia, more than two-thirds of the population holds positive views of Moscow and its aggression against Ukraine. Vučić can still be toppled, of course, but it’s not a 1:1 comparison with Hungary.”

Separately, now Orban is now longer able to wield his veto in the EU to protect his allies, Serbia could also see a tougher line from Brussels. Orbán had often acted as a shield for Belgrade within EU debates. Without his backing, Serbia may face greater scrutiny from Brussels at a sensitive moment in its accession process.

According to comments reported by Politico days before the vote, Serbia risks losing up to €1.5bn in EU funding over concerns about judicial independence, media freedom and its ties to Russia. “We are increasingly worried about what is happening in Serbia,” EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos said as quoted by Politico. “From laws that undermine the independence of the judiciary to crackdowns on protesters and recurrent meddling in independent media.”

Bosnia and beyond

In Bosnia, Dodik, another key Orbán ally, had publicly backed the Hungarian leader ahead of the vote, writing on April 10: “I wish my dear friend Viktor Orbán the best of luck and success in the upcoming elections. I am confident that the Hungarian people will once again recognise the strength of a policy that safeguards sovereignty, stability, and the future of their country. Republika Srpska stands with you.”

Orbán’s departure from power could open the door to stronger EU action against Dodik, who has faced U.S. sanctions over his secessionist agenda.

“The single biggest, most productive policy option that becomes available to the EU with Orbán out re: the Balkans is deployment of long delayed union-wide sanctions vs. Bosnian Serb secessionist Dodik,” Mujanović wrote on X. “Plenković and Fico will object but are much weaker without Orbán's support.”

In North Macedonia, the political legacy of Orbán’s alliances remains visible in the unresolved case of Gruevski, whose extradition Skopje continues to pursue after multiple failed attempts.

North Macedonia’s opposition party, Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) said the election outcome in Hungary marks a major victory for democracy over autocracy, signalling the end of long-standing authoritarian rule in the country.

The party said the ruling VMRO-DPMNE has been left without its key ally in the European Union, adding that this could end the protection of Gruevski in Budapest and curb alleged opaque dealings and external financial influence.

“The criminal organisation VMRO is left without its only ally in the EU. No more hiding Nikola Gruevski in Budapest, no more secret business combinations, no more Chinese money coming through that regime,” SDSM said. The party said the decline of authoritarian leadership in the region could extend further, naming Vucic and North Macedonia's PM Hristijan Mickoski among those it expects to face similar political pressure.

For now, the immediate impact of Hungary’s election will depend on how quickly the incoming government reshapes foreign policy and whether it distances itself from Orbán’s network of alliances. But more broadly it is already clear: a central node in the illiberal political web in the EU’s periphery has been removed, leaving its partners to recalibrate in a more uncertain and potentially less accommodating European landscape.