Hungary’s political landscape has been reshaped by the electoral defeat of longtime Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, but expectations that the country will now pivot sharply away from Russia and toward a more assertive European Union policy on Ukraine may prove misplaced, says a commentary by Carnegie Politika.

The opposition Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, swept to victory in parliamentary elections on April 12, ending Orbán’s two-decade dominance. While Magyar is widely expected to soften Hungary’s combative tone within the EU, analysts say structural constraints will limit how far he can go.

Orbán had cultivated a reputation as the EU’s chief spoiler on Ukraine policy, positioning himself as a lone dissenter. However, this image was somewhat misleading. “Orbán created an image for himself as virtually the only opponent of aid to Ukraine in the entire EU,” writes Maksim Samorukov, fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. However, he adds, “in reality, he was simply willing to use his veto to absorb all the backlash, allowing other opponents to remain in the shadows.”

Hungary’s deep-rooted ties with Russia, particularly in the energy sector, predate Orbán and will continue to shape policy under his successor, according to Samorukov. Even during the Cold War, Budapest relied heavily on Soviet energy supplies, and diversification efforts since the 1990s have only partially reduced that dependence.

Today, Russian involvement remains embedded in key sectors of the Hungarian economy. Multibillion-dollar loans tied to the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant, gas imports routed through the TurkStream pipeline, and oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline all underpin economic stability. “No leader could afford to sacrifice all that overnight,” Samorukov said.

Magyar has acknowledged these realities. During the campaign, he avoided bold pledges on Russia, offering instead cautious proposals to review existing agreements for corruption and “gradually reduce dependence on Russian supplies by the mid-2030s”, as pointed out by Samorukov. Such timelines fall well short of EU targets to eliminate Russian energy imports by 2027.

Domestic political constraints further complicate any rapid shift. Although Tisza has taken power, much of the state apparatus remains staffed by Orbán-era appointees, including senior judicial figures and prosecutors. Efforts to overhaul these institutions quickly would risk destabilising governance and provoking resistance from entrenched interests.

As a result, Magyar faces a difficult choice: pursue incremental reforms within the existing system or engage in a prolonged struggle against the old guard, Samorukov writes. He suggests the former is more likely, pointing to the risk of political and economic disruption.

Orbán’s downfall itself had little to do with foreign policy. Instead, it stemmed from domestic concerns, particularly economic stagnation and perceptions that the prime minister had grown detached from everyday governance. After years in power, critics said he was “far more interested in meeting with global leaders and facilitating ultra-right parties around Europe than in attempting an economic recovery at home,” the commentary said. 

Magyar’s Tisza movement capitalised on this fatigue, presenting itself as a generational alternative rather than an ideological break. Many of its leaders, including Magyar, emerged from the same political elite as Orbán’s Fidesz party, highlighting the continuity underlying Hungary’s political transition.

The new government is expected to repair relations with Brussels, particularly to unlock billions of euros in frozen EU funds withheld over rule-of-law concerns, says Samorukov. There is growing speculation that the EU may release a substantial portion of these funds without demanding sweeping concessions, partly as a reward for Orbán’s removal.

“Reducing the share of Russian energy supplies in the Hungarian economy can take a back seat for now,” Samorukov suggests, as Brussels prioritises political normalisation over immediate structural change.

Relations with Ukraine are also likely to improve in tone but not necessarily in substance, Samorukov forecasts. Magyar is expected to adopt a less confrontational approach than Orbán, whose disputes with Kyiv often spilled into EU forums. However, policy differences remain significant.

Magyar has indicated that Ukraine’s potential EU membership should be subject to a referendum in Hungary, opposes arms deliveries, and has raised concerns about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in western Ukraine. Public opinion reflects this ambivalence: even among Tisza supporters, more respondents view Ukraine as a threat than as a partner.

These attitudes are not unique to Hungary. Across Central and Eastern Europe, enthusiasm for Ukraine’s integration into the EU has waned, driven by concerns over competition for subsidies, labor markets, and agricultural exports.

In this broader context, Hungary’s leadership change is unlikely to transform EU policy. While Orbán’s departure removes a consistent veto player, it does not eliminate underlying divisions within the bloc.

“In his absence, someone else is likely to step up and call for second thoughts on providing extra help to Kyiv or imposing new sanctions on Moscow,” Samorukov noted, highlighting the persistence of dissenting voices.

For Russia, the loss of a reliable ally in Budapest presents challenges. The Kremlin had cultivated close ties with Orbán, relying on his support to blunt EU initiatives. Establishing a similar relationship with Magyar will be more difficult, particularly given the current geopolitical climate.

Nevertheless, expectations of a dramatic shift may be overstated. Hungary’s economic ties to Russia, combined with broader European uncertainties, will continue to constrain policy.

The EU itself faces mounting pressures, including internal political divisions, strained relations with the United States, and the economic impact of global conflicts and high energy prices. These factors complicate efforts to maintain a unified and robust stance on Russia.

For now, Hungary appears set to adopt a more cooperative tone within the EU while maintaining many of the underlying policies shaped by geography, economics, and public opinion—suggesting continuity rather than transformation in Europe’s approach to Russia and Ukraine.