The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) has evolved its approach toward Tajikistan, shifting from explicit support for neighbour Kyrgyzstan during border conflicts to more inclusive language. Early OTS statements emphasised brotherly solidarity with Kyrgyzstan while implicitly attributing blame to Tajikistan, prompting sharp criticism from Dushanbe. Following diplomatic progress culminating in the March 2025 Kyrgyz-Tajik border treaty, OTS rhetoric shifted significantly. The organisation’s March 2025 statement on the trilateral Khujand summit explicitly included Tajikistan among three brotherly nations, marking the first time such fraternal language extended to a non-Turkic state. This evolution reflects practical necessity—avoiding the alienation of a major regional state—and organisational maturation as the OTS launches its plus framework for engaging non-member states.

BACKGROUND

Tajikistan has been the topic of six official OTS statements since 2021—all in the context of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border conflict. Through these statements runs a common thread: member solidarity among Turkic states. Yet the rhetoric has evolved significantly, tracking changes in the situation on the ground and reflecting the OTS's maturation as a regional organisation.

Understanding this evolution reveals how the OTS is navigating the tension between its ethnolinguistic foundation and the practical requirements of regional cooperation. The trajectory of OTS statements on Tajikistan offers insight into whether the organisation can transcend ethnic boundaries to become an inclusive platform for regional stability.

The early statements from 2021-2022 established clear patterns. An April 2021 statement, issued during border clashes, referred to "brotherly Kyrgyzstan, the founding member of the Turkic Council," explicitly emphasising ethnic and cultural kinship while omitting similar recognition of Tajikistan. The statement appealed to shared Islamic and cultural identity as the moral basis for peace: "In the holy month of Ramadan, we need to do our utmost to further unite and put aside our differences." This extended an intra-Turkic appeal rather than adopting a neutral, diplomatic tone.

The statement emphasised "the contribution of the Kyrgyz side to the re-establishment of peace," without mentioning Tajikistan's efforts, implying the ongoing conflict was the fault of Tajikistan's failure to commit to peace. The closing line committed the Secretariat to remain "in close contact with the Government of brotherly Kyrgyzstan," signalling preferential solidarity with the Turkic side of the conflict.

A January 2022 statement followed similar patterns. Again, the OTS expressed "support to the efforts of the Kyrgyz Republic to find a peaceful solution" while calling for dialogue "based on mutual understanding, mutual respect, good neighborliness and coexistence." The contrast was striking: "good neighborliness and coexistence" for Tajikistan versus "brotherly" solidarity for Kyrgyzstan. The September 2022 statement went further, explicitly condemning "the aggression with the use of heavy military weapons against civilians and civilian infrastructure" while expressing support for "the efforts of the Kyrgyz Republic, founding member of the OTS, for a peaceful solution."

IMPLICATIONS

The Tajik government clearly noticed this pattern. Following a September 2022 statement, Tajikistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the OTS Secretary General's statement as "hindering the efforts of the Tajik and Kyrgyz sides to resolve all bilateral issues exclusively by political and diplomatic means." The Ministry called the OTS statement "deeply regrettable, as it is at odds with the goals declared by the Organization, one of which is to make a joint contribution to ensuring peace and stability throughout the world." The states having OTS full membership status are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

This response illustrates the practical impact of one-sided statements. The Tajiks claimed the OTS impeded progress on peaceful diplomatic solutions through its skewed narrative. For an organisation aspiring to regional significance, alienating a Central Asian state posed obvious problems. Tajikistan shares borders with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and China, making its exclusion from regional cooperation mechanisms a significant limitation.

The turning point came with actual progress in the border dispute. On March 13, 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a Treaty on the State Border in Bishkek. The OTS issued two statements on this development that marked a subtle but significant shift in rhetoric. The statements welcomed the agreement warmly and noted it was "achieved through diplomacy and dialogue." While these statements still didn't explicitly call Tajikistan "brotherly," they avoided the one-sided emphasis of earlier statements.

More significant was the March 31, 2025 statement on the trilateral summit of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in Khujand. For the first time, the OTS Secretary General referred to "three brotherly nations," explicitly including Tajikistan in the fraternal vocabulary previously reserved solely for Turkic states. The statement called the summit "epochal" and praised "the unwavering efforts of the three brotherly nations in deepening regional partnership."

This represented a genuine shift—but one that maintained certain boundaries. The concluding sentence pledged support for "unity and cooperation among Turkic and neighboring states," still categorising Tajikistan as neighbouring rather than fully integrated. Tajikistan was offered a relationship within the already-defined Turkic community rather than recognition as its own self-defined actor. Nevertheless, the shift from implicit antagonist to "brotherly nation" marked significant evolution.

CONCLUSIONS

What explains this shift? The most obvious factor is the changed situation on the ground. As long as armed clashes continued along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, the OTS faced pressure to support one of its member states. Once diplomatic progress produced actual agreements, the organisation could adopt more inclusive language without appearing to abandon Kyrgyzstan.

The OTS's broader ambitions also likely influenced this evolution. At the 2025 Gabala Summit, the organisation launched the "OTS plus" framework to structure relationships with non-Turkic states. Maintaining openly hostile rhetoric towards Tajikistan while proposing inclusive mechanisms would appear contradictory. The trilogy of summits—Kyrgyz-Tajik bilateral agreement, Kyrgyz-Uzbek-Tajik trilateral summit, and the OTS Gabala summit—created momentum toward regional cooperation that required softer rhetoric.

Uzbekistan's role may have been particularly important. As the OTS member bordered by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan had clear interests in promoting inclusive regional cooperation. Uzbekistan's enthusiastic embrace of OTS membership from 2019 onward coincided with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's broader policy of improving relations with all neighbours. Uzbekistan likely advocated internally for more inclusive OTS approaches to Tajikistan.

The evolution of OTS rhetoric on Tajikistan thus reflects both practical necessity and organisational maturation. An organisation aspiring to regional significance cannot indefinitely alienate major regional states. The shift from implicit antagonism to tentative inclusion suggests the OTS recognises this reality. Whether "OTS plus" will genuinely integrate non-Turkic states as equal partners, or merely formalise their status as perpetual outsiders, remains to be seen. But the trajectory of OTS statements on Tajikistan—from pointed solidarity with Kyrgyzstan to inclusive "brotherly" language—indicates the organisation is navigating tensions between its ethnic foundation and regional cooperation requirements.

For policymakers both within and outside the region, this evolution merits attention. It suggests the OTS may prove more flexible and pragmatic than its ethnolinguistic foundation initially implied. How the organization manages the tension between Turkic identity and inclusive regionalism will significantly impact its effectiveness as a platform for addressing shared challenges in security, transportation and economic development.

This article was originally published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and reprinted under a partner post arrangement with Eurasianet here.

Lindsey Cliff is a junior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, who is also pursuing a Master’s degree at Georgetown University in Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies.