The Democratic Republic of Congo sits on mineral resources whose untapped value has been widely estimated at around $24 trillion, although the frequently cited valuation is based on older estimates and has surely grown. The DRC’s ability to exploit that wealth increasingly depends on whether infrastructure investment can keep pace with mining growth.

The country is already the world’s second-largest copper producer after Chile and by far the largest source of cobalt, while new investment is opening up lithium and zinc resources alongside established gold, tin and tantalum production.

The scale of the expansion has been rapid. The US Geological Survey estimates that the DRC produced 3.2mn tonnes of mined copper in 2025 and holds reserves of around 80mn tonnes. Cobalt output reached around 230,000 tonnes in 2025, equivalent to about 73% of global mine production. The country holds an estimated 6mn tonnes, or half of the world’s cobalt reserves.

Mining is already driving the wider economy. Mining output grew by 10.1% in 2025, helping real GDP expand by an estimated 5.5%, according to the World Bank. Growth is forecast to average 5.1% between 2026 and 2028, with the pace of mining expansion expected to moderate as some major projects mature.

Infrastructure is becoming the main constraint. The country has vast hydropower resources, but electricity supply remains unreliable, while poor roads and railways increase the cost of developing and operating mines.

China already has a powerful position in the country. Growing US and European investment is increasing competition over infrastructure and mineral supply chains, with the Lobito Corridor emerging as a major focus.

China dominates mining investment

Chinese investment has been central to the rapid expansion of the mining industry, spanning major copper and cobalt operations, processing capacity, supporting infrastructure and, increasingly, lithium.

CMOC (SSE: 603993; HKEX: 3993), the Chinese mining group, shows the scale of that investment. It owns 80% of Tenke Fungurume and 71.25% of Kisanfu, two of the largest copper-cobalt operations in the country. Its Congolese mines produced 741,100 tonnes of copper and 117,500 tonnes of cobalt in 2025. Tenke Fungurume has an annual copper production capacity of more than 450,000 tonnes, while Kisanfu can produce more than 200,000 tonnes.

Chinese investment is also significant at the Kamoa-Kakula copper mining complex. Zijin Mining (SSE: 601899; HKEX: 2899) owns 39.6%, alongside Canadian mining company Ivanhoe Mines (TSX: IVN; OTCQX: IVPAF) with 39.6%, the Congolese government with 20% and Crystal River Global with 0.8%. Kamoa-Kakula produced around 389,000 tonnes of copper in 2025.

Zijin is also developing the Manono lithium project with Congolese state interests, extending its presence beyond the Copperbelt.

China’s dominance extends further down the value chain. The DRC dominates global cobalt mining, yet China accounts for around 75-80% of global cobalt processing. Copper is different, with substantially more refining already taking place domestically.

Western companies remain important. Glencore (LSE: GLEN; JSE: GLN), the Switzerland-based commodities and mining group, produced a combined 247,800 tonnes of copper at KCC and Mutanda in 2025, 10% more than a year earlier, alongside 33,500 tonnes of cobalt. Production strengthened during the second half as higher-grade ore and improved recoveries lifted output.

Competition between the US and China goes well beyond ownership of individual mines. China has established mining and processing assets, strong commercial ties and is a major buyer of Congolese minerals. The US and its partners are responding by financing infrastructure and developing alternative supply chains. The government hopes this competition will bring the investment needed to support further mining growth.

Gaylor Montmasson-Clair, co-founder and director of Southern Transitions, said in June that intensifying competition among China, the US and Europe for copper supplies was strengthening the negotiating position of African producers. He argued that countries such as the DRC and Zambia had an opportunity to use that leverage to capture more processing and manufacturing activity rather than remaining primarily suppliers of raw materials.

Power deficit threatens further growth

Power is one of the biggest constraints. The DRC has enormous hydroelectric potential, yet an unreliable grid and inadequate transmission infrastructure mean some of its largest mines have had to secure much of their own electricity supply.

Matt Tilleard, chief executive of CrossBoundary Energy, estimates that the DRC mining sector faces a power deficit of around 1 GW, underscoring the scale of additional generation required as copper and other mineral production expands.

The Inga site alone has estimated hydroelectric potential of around 42,000 MW, although successive expansion plans have faced repeated delays.

Kamoa-Kakula demonstrates the scale of the challenge. Ivanhoe helped finance the refurbishment of Turbine 5 at the Inga II hydroelectric plant, restoring 178 MW of generating capacity. Kamoa initially secured an additional 50 MW, with its allocation expected to rise towards 150 MW as transmission upgrades are completed. These include improvements to substations at Inga and Kolwezi designed to increase power delivery and grid stability.

A 60 MW uninterruptible power supply has also been installed to protect Kamoa’s smelter from voltage fluctuations. Separately, Ivanhoe said in August that commissioning was under way on two hybrid solar-and-battery facilities comprising 433 MWp of photovoltaic capacity and 1,107 MWh of storage, designed to provide 60 MW of continuous baseload power. The 233 MWp CrossBoundary Energy component was reported commissioned in September.

The pressure will increase as production and processing expand. Ivanhoe expects Kamoa-Kakula’s total power requirement to rise from 208 MW at the end of 2025 to 347 MW by the end of 2028.

Electricity problems extend beyond copper. Grid reliability is an explicit risk at Kipushi, the major zinc operation near the Zambian border, where backup generation capacity has been increased to around 20 MW. The mine nevertheless produced a record 70,177 tonnes of zinc in concentrate in the second quarter of 2026, equivalent to an annualised rate of around 280,000 tonnes, against full-year guidance of 240,000-290,000 tonnes.

Kibali, one of Africa’s largest gold mines, has no national grid connection. Barrick Mining (NYSE: B; TSX: ABX), the Canadian gold and copper producer that operates the mine, developed three hydropower stations with a combined capacity of around 43 MW. A 16 MW solar plant and battery storage system were commissioned in 2025, raising renewable energy to 85% of Kibali’s power mix and allowing the operation to run entirely on renewable electricity for six months of the year.

Processing push raises infrastructure demand

Greater domestic processing is becoming another source of infrastructure demand. The 2018 Mining Code requires mineral production to be processed or transformed domestically, subject to exemptions. More recent measures have tightened government control over how copper and cobalt leave the country.

A joint ministerial order dated June 29, 2026 prohibited exports of copper and cobalt concentrates, although strategic exemptions can be granted for up to one year.

The government’s cobalt policy has become even more interventionist. A temporary export ban introduced in February 2025 followed a sharp fall in cobalt prices amid global oversupply. It was replaced by a quota system allowing up to 96,600 tonnes of contained cobalt annually in 2026 and 2027, including 9,600 tonnes reserved for national strategic purposes. The measures are intended to restrict supply and support prices while encouraging greater value addition.

Copper is already further along this path. Refined copper production reached an estimated 2.8mn tonnes in 2025, according to the US Geological Survey. Kamoa-Kakula has added a 500,000-tonne-a-year direct-to-blister copper smelter, the largest in Africa, which produced its first anodes in December 2025. The facility also produces sulphuric acid for sale to other Copperbelt mines.

Cobalt presents a different picture. The DRC accounts for roughly three-quarters of global mine production, while China handles almost 80% of global processing. Much of the material leaves as cobalt hydroxide and other intermediate products before undergoing further processing abroad.

Capturing more of that value domestically will require dependable electricity, water and transport links for smelters, refineries and other processing plants.

Lobito opens an Atlantic export route

The Lobito Corridor has meanwhile moved from a proposed alternative export route to an operating railway carrying Congolese minerals to the Atlantic. In early 2026, Kamoa-Kakula shipped its first 99.7%-pure copper anodes by rail to the Port of Lobito in Angola for onward shipment to Europe. The rail journey averages around seven days, compared with more than three weeks by truck to Durban or Dar es Salaam.

Investment is now focused on turning those initial shipments into a much larger regional freight system. The US International Development Finance Corporation agreed a $553mn loan in December 2025, alongside $200mn from the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The $753mn package supports rehabilitation of Angola’s roughly 1,300-km railway and the Lobito mineral terminal.

DFC expects the upgrades to increase capacity from about 400,000 tonnes to 4.6mn tonnes a year and reduce critical-mineral transport costs by as much as 30%.

The larger expansion extends beyond Angola. Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), the pan-African infrastructure investor leading development of the wider corridor, plans 315 km of new railway in the DRC and 515 km in Zambia, connecting mining regions to the existing Benguela line.

AFC is preparing to raise $3bn-$5bn, with the financing round due to start in the third quarter of 2026 and financial close targeted for the fourth quarter of 2027. Completion is planned for 2030, although that timetable remains dependent on financing, construction and coordination across the three countries. At least ten African and international lenders are already in discussions.

The gap between current traffic and those ambitions remains large. Lobito Atlantic Railway, the private rail concessionaire, carried close to 200,000 tonnes of international cargo in 2025, only a fraction of planned future capacity. Flooding in Angola disrupted traffic in 2026, highlighting the need for greater resilience as volumes increase.

The Congolese section has also moved forward. In August, the DRC awarded Mota-Engil (Euronext Lisbon: EGL) a 30-year concession covering the roughly 1,004-km Dilolo-Sakania railway through Kolwezi, Tenke and Lubumbashi. The agreement covers financing, rehabilitation, modernisation, operation and maintenance of the line. Mota-Engil has put investment over the concession period at as much as $1.8bn.

The Congolese government wants Lobito to develop beyond a mineral export railway, using improved transport and power links to support local processing, industry and trade along the corridor.

US-China competition reshapes transport routes

The geopolitical contest is also playing out in transport. Lobito is central to Washington’s attempt to build critical-mineral supply chains less dependent on China. Beijing is backing a $1.4bn rehabilitation of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, strengthening another route towards the Indian Ocean.

In practice, Western- and Chinese-backed infrastructure will form part of the same regional transport network. Chinese-backed mines can use Lobito when it offers competitive costs and transit times, while minerals will continue moving east and south through alternative corridors.

For miners, several reliable routes would improve capacity, resilience and bargaining power. The test for the DRC is whether geopolitical competition produces functioning cross-border infrastructure rather than another cycle of financing commitments and feasibility studies.

Manono tests infrastructure beyond the Copperbelt

The infrastructure challenge becomes more difficult as mining expands beyond the established Copperbelt. Manono in Tanganyika province provides an early test. Zijin Mining’s Manono Lithium joint venture started production at its processing plant in May 2026, a month ahead of schedule. Trial exports began in June, followed by the first officially certified lithium shipment in July.

Zijin is targeting 30,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent in 2026, while the project’s eventual design capacity is about 1mn tonnes of spodumene concentrate a year from 5mn tonnes of ore.

Bringing Manono into production has required substantial investment beyond the mine itself. The nearby Mpiana-Mwanga hydropower station has been rehabilitated by Katamba Mining at a cost of more than $80mn, restoring installed capacity to around 40 MW. The first turbine came online in late 2024, with further capacity increases planned. Zijin has also invested in roads, bridges and supporting infrastructure.

Initial lithium exports are being trucked roughly 440 km to Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika before continuing through Tanzania towards China, highlighting the logistical complexity of developing a major mineral resource far from established export corridors.

Further processing is planned, with a smelter and other downstream facilities expected to begin operating by the end of 2026. However, the project remains subject to a legal dispute with AVZ Minerals, the Australian mining company whose previous licence was revoked. KoBold Metals, the US-backed mineral exploration company holding an adjoining Manono licence, has said it will not begin development until related ownership disputes are resolved.

Transport infrastructure will become increasingly important if new mining regions emerge. The road network extends for more than 150,000 km, but only a small proportion is paved, while the roughly 5,000-km rail network is fragmented and largely requires rehabilitation.

Conditions are tougher still in the east. Tin, tantalum and other minerals there move through more fragmented, often artisanal supply chains that face the same transport and infrastructure deficits, compounded by insecurity.

Aviation also plays an important role in connecting remote mining centres given the poor condition of much of the road network. Upgrades are under way or planned at Kolwezi, Lubumbashi and Kalemie, while Kolwezi is being developed towards international-airport status.

Manono illustrates how the economics of future discoveries will depend on more than ore grades. New mineral provinces will require power, roads, aviation links and viable routes to export markets, adding substantially to development costs.

The scale of the opportunity nevertheless remains exceptional. Copper production has already risen to 3.2mn tonnes a year. Cobalt, lithium and zinc provide additional growth.

So far, major miners have often solved infrastructure problems themselves. Kamoa-Kakula has invested in power and processing, Kibali operates its own energy system, and Zijin has helped develop power and transport infrastructure around Manono. That model works for large, high-margin deposits but is harder to replicate across a broader mining industry.

Investment now under way could begin to change that. Lobito is targeting freight capacity of 4.6mn tonnes a year, its wider rail expansion is planned for completion by 2030, and new transmission, renewable-power and processing projects are being developed alongside mine expansion. China is simultaneously investing in alternative transport infrastructure, including the $1.4bn TAZARA rehabilitation.

Competition between China, the US and other investors could accelerate that build-out. By 2030, projects such as Lobito will show whether enough power, rail and processing capacity has been added to keep pace with mining growth. The mineral resources and investor interest are already there; infrastructure will determine how much of that opportunity can be realised.