Georgia’s conservative government has tried to court the administration of US President Donald Trump with ideological alignment and overtures of loyalty. But despite those efforts, Washington appears increasingly uninterested in Tbilisi, turning instead to Armenia and Azerbaijan as it reshapes its strategy in the South Caucasus around infrastructure and geopolitical dealmaking.

The shift was highlighted in February when US Vice President JD Vance toured the region but skipped Georgia entirely, visiting only Armenia and Azerbaijan — countries that Washington now sees as more central to its economic and strategic plans.

“It wasn’t so long ago that Georgia was considered to be Washington’s main partner in the South Caucasus — but this time Vance only visited Armenia and Azerbaijan,” wrote Bashir Kitachaev in a commentary published by Carnegie Politika.

The visit highlighted a broader realignment in US policy that appears to value concrete economic partnerships over political affinity. Despite some ideological similarities between the Trump administration and Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party, those ties have failed to translate into renewed engagement.

Silence from Washington

Since Trump returned to the White House in 2025, Georgian leaders have attempted to reset relations with Washington. The government softened earlier anti-American rhetoric and appealed directly to the new administration.

Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze wrote to Trump describing Georgia as a “loyal strategic partner” and expressing concern about the state of bilateral ties.

In the letter, Kobakhidze argued that the two governments shared similar views on several issues. “We spoke openly about the criminal activity of the ‘deep state,’ USAID, NED, and other groups years before you made similar statements. We have identical assessments of the war in Ukraine, gender and LGBT propaganda, and many other issues,” he wrote.

Even symbolic gestures have been scarce. Georgia was not invited to join Trump’s newly announced “Board of Peace”, despite invitations being extended to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

A new regional focus

The apparent snub reflects a shift in US priorities in the region. Rather than focusing on democracy promotion — once a central pillar of Washington’s engagement with Georgia — the Trump administration is prioritising infrastructure, energy and security deals that can produce immediate geopolitical gains.

“The United States is no longer interested in purely political ventures,” Kitachaev wrote. “Trump wants to reshape the world order through dealmaking and infrastructure projects that can instantly generate geopolitical and economic gains.”

In that framework, Armenia and Azerbaijan offer clearer opportunities, according to the comment published by Carnegie Politika. During Vance’s visit, discussions centred on a proposed initiative linking the United States with the two South Caucasus states on energy, security cooperation and a new transport corridor known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

The project would link mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan via southern Armenia, potentially creating a new land route connecting Asia and Europe.

If realised, it could transform regional trade routes — but also diminish Georgia’s long-standing role as the key east-west transit corridor across the South Caucasus.

“The realisation of such a project would downgrade Georgia’s importance in terms of transit,” Kitachaev wrote, noting that the country has long been considered the region’s main bridge between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has already suggested that once operational, the corridor could handle most cargo flows through the region.

Struggling to stay relevant

For Georgia, the strategic consequences could be highly negative. The country has already seen its international reputation weakened by political tensions at home and criticism from Western governments over democratic standards.

While the US State Department still speaks of maintaining a “constructive relationship”, officials have emphasised that Georgia must address concerns about democratic backsliding.

Yet Kitachaev argues that political issues alone do not explain Washington’s cooling attitude.

“It’s hard to imagine that problems with democratic freedoms are really what is preventing Washington from deepening ties with Tbilisi,” he wrote. “It’s much more likely to be a change in the logic of US policy in the South Caucasus.”

He writes that in contrast to Georgia, both Armenia and Azerbaijan bring tangible assets to the table.

Armenia has been gradually distancing itself from Russia and expanding energy cooperation with Western partners. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, offers natural resources and military cooperation despite its authoritarian political system.

“Together, Baku and Yerevan give the White House an opportunity to announce the triumphant resolution of another long-running military conflict,” Kitachaev wrote, referring to ongoing peace negotiations between the two countries.

Concerns over China

Another factor complicating Georgia’s relationship with Washington is the development of a deep-water port at Anaklia on the Black Sea.

The project was originally conceived as a Western-backed initiative aimed at strengthening Georgia’s role in transport routes bypassing Russia. But after earlier proposals collapsed, Tbilisi awarded the project to a Chinese-led consortium.

“In Washington, this was taken as a sign of Tbilisi’s changing geopolitical priorities,” Kitachaev wrote.

Specifically, the decision raised concerns in the United States that Georgia might be drifting closer to Beijing at a time when Washington is increasingly focused on strategic competition with China.