The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has moved decisively beyond its origins as a cultural and linguistic forum, increasingly positioning itself as a regional platform for defence and security cooperation.

The October 2025 summit in Gabala, Azerbaijan, marked a turning point in this evolution, with leaders openly embracing the group’s role in shaping Eurasian security dynamics.

“The OTS has become a key geopolitical centre,” said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the summit. His remarks were echoed by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who described the organisation as “an authoritative structure uniting Turkic populations.” For observers in Washington and Brussels, the implications of this shift are beginning to register.

Svante E. Cornell, Research Director at the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, said in a note: “The OTS has transformed into a vehicle for regional middle powers – specifically Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan – to fill the security vacuum that has plagued the heart of Eurasia for three decades.”

Since its institutionalisation in 2009 and formal rebranding in 2021, the OTS has steadily expanded its remit. While initial cooperation focused on culture and economics, member states have increasingly turned to security and defence. “It was the Samarkand summit in 2022 that marked the start of this transition,” Cornell noted, pointing to calls for closer military collaboration and defence industry ties.

Aliyev, re-elected in 2024, has become a vocal proponent of a security agenda for the OTS, repeatedly calling for enhanced cooperation in military affairs. “The main guarantor of security becomes defence potential,” he said during the 2023 Astana summit, urging members to deepen collaboration in security and defence.

Turkey remains the most capable military actor among OTS members and has cultivated bilateral ties with other Turkic states. The 2021 Shusha Declaration formalised a defence pact with Azerbaijan, underpinned by Ankara’s support in the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Similar patterns have followed in Central Asia, where Turkey has signed defence and intelligence agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while exporting UAVs to Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

Yet the OTS’s evolution is not solely driven by Turkey. “The Turkic middle powers have been at least as forceful as Turkey in driving the rise of Turkic cooperation,” said Cornell. In recent years, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have concluded a series of bilateral defence pacts, intelligence-sharing agreements, and military exercises with Azerbaijan and each other, outside Ankara’s direct involvement.

The Gabala summit in 2025 went further still. The theme of “Regional Peace and Security” signalled a more overt embrace of military coordination. The summit declaration included plans for a “Treaty on Strategic Partnership, Eternal Friendship, and Brotherhood of Turkic States,” while Azerbaijan offered to host the first military exercise under the OTS banner.

A July 2025 meeting in Istanbul of defence industry heads, convened under OTS auspices, reinforced these efforts. Azerbaijan is expected to host a follow-up in 2026, with discussions underway to standardise equipment and enhance joint production capabilities.

While the OTS Charter adopted in 2024 stops short of a mutual defence clause, its language referencing solidarity and joint resistance to threats is, according to Cornell, “reminiscent of early European Union formulations before the Lisbon Treaty’s mutual defence provisions.”

This progression may present new strategic opportunities for Western powers. “OTS activities are largely complementary to Western policies,” Cornell argued. “They fill voids that Europe and the US have been unwilling or unable to fill in the security architecture of Greater Central Asia.”

Despite its growing prominence, the OTS still lacks formal mechanisms for collective defence or unified command. However, its trajectory suggests a deepening of coordination that could challenge Russia’s waning influence in the region. “The weakness of the CSTO and Moscow’s preoccupation with Ukraine have opened the space,” Cornell said. “Turkic cooperation is intensifying so rapidly it can no longer be ignored.”