Hungary’s official campaign season begins in March, but the country is already gripped by what may be its most turbulent electoral contest in decades. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is running for a fifth term in office and this time he may lose.

“Politics has become everyday conversation,” writes Zsuzsanna Szelényi, director at the Democracy Institute Leadership Academy at Central European University, in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Hungarians openly ask whether Prime Minister Viktor Orban can finally be defeated in the April parliamentary elections.”

For the first time in fifteen years the dominance of Orban’s ruling Fidesz party appears visibly weakened. “The decline is measurable,” she says, pointing to polls showing Fidesz trailing a new challenger by double digits. “The methods and manipulations his government is employing to try to stave off defeat are also a labouratory of electoral manipulation, which deserves to be watched closely across Europe.”

At the centre of this unexpected shift is Peter Magyar, a political newcomer and former Fidesz insider who has rapidly built momentum. “Within months, his party, Tisza, caught up with Fidesz in the polls and has now established a polling lead between ten and twelve%,” Szelényi writes. For a ruling party that has faced no credible opposition since 2010, she argues, “this represents an existential challenge.”

Orban’s grip on power, she observes, is not merely about political office. “Fidesz is not merely a ruling party but a revolutionary political force that has used institutions and public resources to systematically reshape the Hungarian state.” A loss of power, she adds, “would deprive him of this extraordinary reservoir of influence. Simply put, he cannot afford to lose.”

The response to Magyar’s rise has been swift and aggressive. “The government responded with a familiar playbook, launching a smear campaign almost immediately,” says Szelényi. But unlike past opposition leaders, Magyar has proven “remarkably resilient,” drawing strength from a combative style and grassroots mobilisation. “He has appropriated elements of Fidesz’s own populist communication style, symbolic language, and political techniques.”

Orban’s counteroffensive has included changes to the electoral system. “Fidesz has amended the electoral law twice,” Szelényi notes. First, it scrapped the ceiling on campaign spending — a move that benefits a governing party “which in practice operates as an extension of the state.” It then gerrymandered over one-third of electoral districts, disproportionately affecting opposition strongholds.

“Preliminary modelling of the newly-revised electoral system suggests a striking asymmetry,” she writes. Under the changes, “an opposition party may need around 55% of the popular vote to secure a simple parliamentary majority, while Fidesz could potentially win a constitutional supermajority with as little as 45%.”

Szelényi describes a state-funded campaign machine that blends legal loopholes, economic handouts and advanced digital tactics. These include “expansive handouts targeted at voter groups the government hopes to retain or reclaim,” such as subsidised housing loans, pension increases, and bonuses for public sector workers.

But the most significant developments are digital. “Fidesz has built an enormous partisan media ecosystem,” she writes, managed by the National Communication Office and backed by billions in public funds. With new limits on political ads imposed by global platforms, Fidesz has turned to “semiorganised online activism,” including groups like the Fight Club and Digital Citizen Circles. Its main content hub, Megafon, reportedly operated on a €14.5mn ($17.2mn) budget in 2024, allegedly from public funds.

Government-aligned actors have also embraced AI tools to flood the public sphere with manipulated content. “In September, a pro-government outlet published a 600-page document presented as the opposition party’s official programme,” she writes. Though Tisza denied it and experts flagged it as AI-generated, the government launched a national consultation based on its claims.

“AI-generated profiles are producing vast quantities of fabricated and unregulated images and videos promoting government narratives,” Szelényi says. These efforts have intensified anti-Ukraine messaging, casting President Volodymyr Zelenskiy as a foreign enemy and Magyar as his proxy.

Meanwhile, Magyar has countered the online barrage with a “highly agile and visible grassroots campaign,” visiting towns and villages to build support.

In an increasingly polarised environment, “the outcome will ultimately be decided by a few hundred thousand voters,” Szelényi writes, warning that the final days could bring provocations, scandals, or foreign interference.

“Over twenty years, Fidesz has proved to be a trend-setter in using innovative legal tricks and manipulation in political campaigns. Now that the stakes are higher than ever, Orban is already setting new precedents in electoral manipulation that Europe should watch closely.”

Zsuzsanna Szelényi is founding director of the Democracy Institute Leadership Academy at the Central European University and a former member of the Hungarian parliament.