The prosecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and seven co-conspirators marks the coming of age of Brazilian democracy. For the first time in the country's turbulent political history, an attempted coup has been tried in civilian courts rather than swept aside by a complicit or silent judiciary.

The Supreme Court's decision to convict Bolsonaro and his allies on September 11 draws a line under Brazil's past, when military interventions went unpunished and democratic institutions bent to authoritarian pressure. This time, the judiciary assumed the lead role in defending constitutional order.

The Prosecutor General's case was methodical and damning: Bolsonaro and his criminal organisation had constructed an elaborate plot to prevent the peaceful transfer of power after his 2022 electoral defeat. The conviction sends an unmistakable message that Brazil's democratic institutions, however imperfect, will no longer tolerate attempts to subvert the popular will.

Phase one: discrediting the electoral system

The first step in the attempted coup was an effort to undermine confidence in Brazil’s electronic voting system. Before the elections, civil society organisations, universities, and even the armed forces were invited to examine the system for vulnerabilities. They found none.

Dissatisfied with these findings, Bolsonaro pressured the Minister of Defence to alter their conclusions. He also summoned foreign ambassadors to cast doubt on the credibility of Brazil’s elections. These efforts, together with coordinated disinformation campaigns and fake news, were intended to delegitimise the election outcome in advance. In case of defeat, he would claim fraud and cancel the elections.

A four-star general, the Chief Security Advisor, was caught on camera saying: “We have to do something before the elections; afterwards it will be too late. If we have to upend the table, let’s do it.”

In Brazilian military parlance, the expression “virar a mesa” — literally “to turn over the table” — is used to signify carrying out a coup or forcibly provoking regime change.

Phase two: post-election organisation and threats

After losing the election to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the plot intensified. Bolsonaro’s network sought to prevent Lula’s inauguration, planning the assassination of the president-elect, his vice-president, Geraldo Alckmin, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes.

The operation was given a patriotic yet violent name: “Punhal Verde-Amarelo” (Green-and-Yellow Dagger), a reference to Brazil’s national colours.

Surveillance of the Justice’s movements was carried out, while the creation of parallel intelligence channels formed part of a broader strategy to intimidate and manipulate institutional actors.

Phase three: mobilisation and the January 8, 2023 mayhem

Supporters of Bolsonaro were mobilised, culminating in the violent invasion of Brazil’s three branches of government on January 8, 2023. The aim was to provoke such chaos that the incoming administration would declare a state of emergency, enabling the military to seize control, effectively a coup d’état. The plan failed, in part because President Lula was absent from Brasília at the time, responding to a natural disaster, and the government refused to grant exceptional powers to the military.

Judicial outcome and notable votes

Bolsonaro and his aides—including generals, the former Justice Minister, the former Defence Minister, the former Vice-President candidate, the former heads of the navy and the army, the former Security Advisor, and the Information Chief—were sentenced to terms ranging from 27 years and three months to 16 years and one month’s imprisonment. However, the cooperating defendant, Bolsonaro’s aide-de-camp, received a two-year sentence, to be served outside a closed prison regime.

They were convicted of the offences of criminal organisation, attempted violent abolition of the democratic rule of law, attempted coup d’état, damage to federal property, and deterioration of protected heritage assets. The latter two charges relate to the events of January 8 2023, when violent demonstrators invaded and destroyed public buildings, objects, and furniture in Brasília, mirroring the storming of the Capitol by Trump supporters two years earlier in Washington.

Sentences were determined by aggregating the penalties for each of these crimes, according to the degree of individual involvement. The far-right leader received the heaviest penalty: 27 years and three months’ imprisonment, initially to be served under a closed regime, after being found guilty as the leader of the criminal group. Under Brazilian law, the head of such an organisation must serve their sentence in a maximum-security prison.

The point of contention now is whether the rapporteur judge will order Bolsonaro’s transfer to a maximum-security facility, or whether, by virtue of his status as a former president and a military officer, he will instead serve his sentence in a special Federal Police unit or a military barracks.

All defendants have been stripped of their political rights for eight years, meaning they are barred from running for any public office. One of them has also lost their seat in the federal legislature. The military personnel involved will receive a formal mark of dishonour within their respective branches and will be required to pay fines for damages to public property, in addition to a collective fine of approximately $5.5mn.

Yet the trial also revealed an unusual and striking divergence: dissenting Justice Luís Fux issued a vote that backed aspects of the defendant’s position more effectively than the collective defence presented by their lawyers, showcasing both the complexity and fairness of the judicial process.

Brazil as a warning for global democracy

This trial, televised as all Supreme Court trials in view of transparency and accountability, represents a critical precedent for the rule of law in Brazil and beyond, as put by The Economist in last week’s edition.

It demonstrates that even the highest political officeholders can be held accountable under civil law when they attempt to subvert democratic institutions. By bringing a former president and his associates to justice, especially high-ranked generals, the Brazilian judiciary has reinforced the principle that no individual is above the law—a cornerstone of constitutional democracy.

The implications extend far beyond South America’s largest democracy. Around the world, including Europe and the US, democratic institutions face growing stress from leaders seeking to concentrate power, manipulate electoral processes, and undermine independent judiciaries.

Brazil’s example shows the importance of an independent judiciary capable of resisting both domestic and foreign pressures. The trial also illustrates that protecting democracy is not merely about elections, but about maintaining credible rule-of-law mechanisms, safeguarding electoral integrity, transparent judgments, and ensuring accountability for those who attempt to subvert democratic processes.

Moreover, the Bolsonaro trial serves as a cautionary tale for everyone: disinformation campaigns, attempts to discredit elections, and overt pressure on courts are no longer distant threats; they have become tools that established political actors can deploy across continents.

Brazil’s judiciary has set a precedent not just for its own democracy but as a warning for the world: preserving democratic governance requires constant vigilance, robust legal frameworks, and the courage of judges to enforce them, even against the most powerful political figures or external pressure – as the US Embassy in Brasília and its current president did.

Impact on Brazil’s political landscape and the future of Bolsonarism

The conviction of Bolsonaro is poised to reshape Brazil’s political landscape. Domestically, it weakens the credibility of his core political network and the broader far-right, signalling that attempts to subvert democracy carry real legal consequences.

While Bolsonarism remains a potent political force with significant grassroots and evangelical support, the trial is likely to fracture its leadership and reduce its institutional influence.

Meanwhile, once-sympathetic traditional Brazilian elites—industrial, financial, and parts of agribusiness—have already distanced themselves from the former strongman president, considering him too uncivilised and a rude person. Many have shifted their support to Tarcísio de Freitas, governor of São Paulo and the emerging centre-right presidential candidate, who appears to be consolidating Bolsonaro’s former base while presenting a more palatable image for institutional and business interests. Bolsonaro and his family, however, retain popularity among far-right and evangelical voters.

The movement’s transnational dimension is also visible. Eduardo Bolsonaro’s relentless lobbying efforts in the US, combined with external pressures including President Trump’s sanctions and trade tariffs, underscore Bolsonarism’s reliance on international allies to counter domestic legal and political constraints.

The Independence Day celebrations on September 7 by Bolsonaro’s allies, featuring a massive American flag in São Paulo, showed that Bolsonaro’s far-right care less for national interests in the face of Trump’s agenda against Brazil.

While Tarcísio de Freitas embraced certain aspects of the far-right and pronounced hard words against the Supreme Court’s Justices to court Bolsonaro’s base support on Independence Day, widespread criticism from the mainstream conservative press has forced him to distance himself from Bolsonaro during the trial, dealing a fresh blow to the movement.

Looking ahead, Bolsonarism may recalibrate its strategy, concentrating on maintaining mobilised regional power bases and consolidating support among the evangelical and radical electorate.

These voters remain highly engaged in electing representatives and senators who could influence legislative outcomes, including attempts to pass an amnesty law aimed at pardoning Bolsonaro, despite the Brazilian Constitution explicitly stating that crimes against democracy cannot be subject to presidential pardon or legislative amnesty. However, their endgame remains to portray Brazil as being under a “judicial dictatorship.”

The trial sends a clear, didactic message: attempts to undermine democracy and the rule of law will face judicial scrutiny. While this may temper the most extreme strategies within Bolsonaro's movement, its ideological influence and populist appeal will inevitably continue to play a key role in Brazil's political debate and elections in the coming years.