On the back of what was termed by some global media outlets and social media around the world on January 26 as a possible coup d’etat or, as more conservative pundits called, it ‘a purge’ - Beijing for now has gone quiet.

This has not stopped netizens, however, and an avalanche of rumours about said political purge or even a possible internal revolt against President Xi Jinping has swept East Asian social media this week. But beneath the speculation lies something arguably more consequential: a sustained, opaque effort by Xi and his inner circle to reconfigure the political and military architecture of the People’s Republic of China itself.

Officially, Chinese state media and the Communist Party denounce talk of a coup as “baseless noise”. Yet the fact that such rumours have proliferated at all suggests unease in the Chinese capital. Unease about leadership stability, about the direction of the Chinese state, and potentially even Beijing’s posture on the most sensitive question of all: Taiwan.

The purge in plain sight

In recent weeks, Beijing has publicly acknowledged investigations into two of its most senior military figures - General Zhang Youxia and General Liu Zhenli - ostensibly for “serious violations of discipline and law.” In CCP parlance, such charges are a euphemism for political elimination.

These moves are not minor: Zhang Youxia was the vice-chair of the hugely influential Central Military Commission (CMC), the body that, on paper at least, directs the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Liu meanwhile, was the joint staff chief of the CMC - another key post in the nation. Neither man will ever return to the CMC.

As such, their fall leaves the commission with only a fraction of its leadership, and Xi Jinping as the uncontested chair.

British media reporting confirms Xi now holds sole operational control of China’s military, with the CMC made up of its smallest membership number in history. This is significant: military command, once diffused among various senior generals with their own networks, is now concentrated almost entirely in Xi’s hands.

How deep does the shake-up go?

The purge as most are interpreting it is part of Xi’s signature anti-corruption campaign, now in its second decade of operation. Over 200,000 officials have been ‘disciplined’ since 2012 by some estimates, and none of this has spared the PLA.

Yet the speed of the current moves against such major players as CMC big-wigs is alarming. Zhang, despite his seniority and personal ties to top leadership, has now been formally investigated in what is a clear signal that no one, regardless of links, is beyond scrutiny.

In this setting, fringe rumours of a coup, at least in the dramatic sense Western media sometimes imagine, mix with evidence-based concerns about internal fractures or potential manoeuvres for a new phase of governance.

There are two broad – and sensible -interpretations of what’s happening in Beijing.

One, the dominant view among Western sources, is that Xi is intensifying personal power consolidation by clearing potential rivals from the military and other elite institutions to ensure loyalty and reduce the risk of challenges to his authority. This mirrors historical patterns seen under other long-serving authoritarian leaders in China and elsewhere where anti-corruption drives double as instruments of political control.

Another, more dramatic line of reasoning is that these disruptions reflect a deeper crisis, perhaps one triggered by policy disagreements or opposition to Xi’s goal of – as he calls it – retaking Taiwan. To this end, the persistence of rumours about a slow-motion insurrection partly reflects the opacity of the Chinese system where, with leadership communication tightly controlled, gaps in public activity only serve to fuel speculation.

For instance, suggestions that there are unseen power blocs aligned against Xi’s vision, or that figures within the army might balk at an invasion timetable, have already been pondered by China watchers, albeit without firm confirmation.

Taiwan: catalyst or casualty?

The question that haunts policymakers right now is whether this shake-up has anything to do with China’s intentions towards Taiwan.

On the one hand, consolidation of military authority around Xi could indicate preparation for bolder strategic action.

By purging senior officers this could also be aimed at guaranteeing that, when the time comes, the PLA obeys unquestioningly. In that sense, the moves might be seen as clearing the decks for a future Taiwan contingency.

On the other hand, as that the removal of trusted commanders has disrupted traditional chains of command, this will potentially delay any near-term military operation against the self-governing island nation.

It would, however, be unwise to leap from internal personnel shifts to predictions of imminent military conflict – or even claims that it is off the table altogether. The current evidence points more convincingly to a political leadership recalibrating internal power structures than to any overt factional rebellion inside the Communist Party.

Nevertheless, the spectre of a “slow-motion coup” - whether real, exaggerated or somewhere in between - highlights the fragility of the Chinese political system’s external image. In a country where information is so tightly controlled, periods of intense personnel moves inevitably produce uncertainty – and speculation.

Because of this, for foreign capitals in the region, and even as far afield as Washington and London, the immediate conclusion is clear: Beijing’s near-term policy on Taiwan is harder to predict than ever.