On January 20 2026, Russian Ambassador to Bangladesh Aleksandr Khozin met the Chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Tarique Rahman to discuss the strengthening of bilateral ties and wished the BNP a successful electoral campaign. On January 19, the Uralchem Group, one of the largest producers of fertiliser in Russia, gifted 30,000 tonnes of potash to Bangladesh under the framework of the World Food Programme (WFP). On January 16, Bangladeshi Adviser for Finance and Science and Technology Salehuddin Ahmed declared that approximately 350 MW of electricity produced at the Russian-financed Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) would be added to the national grid. On January 15, Bangladeshi Ambassador to Russia Md. Nazrul Islam presented his credentials to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow. These seemingly disconnected incidents demonstrate an important pattern: that the partnership between Bangladesh and Russia has largely continued after the change of government in Bangladesh on August 5, 2024.

Russo–Bangladeshi relations under the Awami League

Between January 2009 and August 2024, the government of Bangladesh, led by the Awami League, pursued close relations with Russia, demonstrated through the acquisition of Russian military equipment, the construction of the Russian-financed Rooppur NPP, the steady increase in bilateral trade, arrival of Russian Navy vessels at Chattogram, occasional Bangladeshi abstention from voting on anti-Russian resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), and the refusal to condemn Russian actions in Ukraine.

Growing Russo–Bangladeshi relations, along with several other factors, had contributed to the deterioration in relations between Bangladesh and the United States. However, it should be noted that the partnership between Dhaka and Moscow, while being extensive, did not amount to an alliance, as illustrated by the Russian refusal to condemn the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas by Myanmar, repeated expressions of Bangladesh’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and Dhaka’s tacit compliance with Western sanctions on Russia.

Trajectory of bilateral ties after the ‘July Uprising’

While Russia officially refrained from commenting on the fall of the previous government in Dhaka in August 2024 as a result of the July Uprising, and was quick to recognise the interim government, Russian state-controlled media outlets, including TASS and Sputnik, viewed the event through the lens of geopolitical conflict and presented it as a Western-backed ‘colour revolution.’ US support for the new government, along with the government’s actions such as the cancellation of a natural gas agreement with Russia’s Gazprom, initially created a perception that Moscow had ‘lost’ its partnership with Dhaka, but this did not occur.

In fact, the interim government continued many of the policies of the previous government vis-à-vis Russia, demonstrated by its abstention on an anti-Russian resolution at the UNGA, continuation of trade and economic ties, participation in Russian-led military exercises, and continued visits by Russian Navy vessels to Chattogram. This allowed Russia to retain much of its ground in Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, since August 2024, Russia’s approach to Bangladesh’s internal politics has evolved to a certain extent. Historically, Moscow had maintained close ties with the Awami League, and those ties persist, as illustrated by the decision of RT, a Russian state-controlled media outlet, to air an interview of ex-Minister of Education Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury. Yet, as the political fortunes of the Awami League dwindled, Moscow built ties with the interim government, and appeared to forge links with the principal political parties of the country, including the BNP and the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. Moscow’s decision to mend fences with the BNP is significant and indicative of its pragmatic approach, as the latter had previously condemned Russian actions in Ukraine and repeatedly criticised what it perceived to be Russian interference in Bangladeshi domestic politics.

New areas of cooperation: labour migration

Also, new avenues of cooperation between Russia and Bangladesh have opened up during this period, particularly in the sphere of labour migration, although this has more to do with Russia’s internal situation rather than the state of its relations with Bangladesh. Russia currently hosts between 12 and 14mn migrant workers, and roughly 10.5mn of them hail from Central Asian states. However, parts of the Russian population have long viewed Central Asian immigrants negatively, and after the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack by suspected Tajik militants which killed 150 people, the Russian government has started to impose restrictions on Central Asian immigrants in response to public pressure. However, Russia is facing a shortage of workers, and so has started recruiting migrant workers from other states, such as India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Vietnam.

As part of this process, Russia has expanded the issuance of work permits to Bangladeshi citizens, reaching 2,777 permits in 2024, which constitutes a 95.8% year-on-year increase. Remittances sent by migrant workers serve as an important stimulant for the Bangladeshi economy, with the country receiving a record $32bn in remittances in 2025. At present, more than 11mn Bangladeshi migrant workers are abroad, and they are concentrated in the Arab Gulf states. As these states increasingly seek to indigenise the workforce though, Bangladesh requires new destinations for its surplus manpower, and the opening up of the Russian labour market is an important development for Bangladesh. However, recent incidents, such as the dismissal of 35 Bangladeshi workers from Russia and allegations of fraud committed by recruitment agencies, demonstrate that Dhaka and Moscow need to properly and rigorously regulate the process of labour migration from Bangladesh to Russia.

Controversial issues: fighters, the India factor, and defence cooperation

Meanwhile, the recruitment of Bangladeshi citizens by the Russian Armed Forces for the Russo–Ukrainian War has generated controversies. The process started during the previous administration and has continued under the interim government. According to available data, more than 100 Bangladeshi citizens have so far been recruited by the Russian military to fight against Ukraine, and approximately 30 have been killed. Some have joined voluntarily, while some others have alleged coercion and deception. However, the approach of the interim government of Bangladesh towards this issue has been surprisingly nonchalant. Dhaka has neither criticised Russia for the recruitment of its citizens into its military nor prosecuted those who have returned to Bangladesh after fighting against Ukraine. This is in sharp contrast with the policies of some post-Soviet states, including Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who have prosecuted their citizens for fighting for the Russian military against Ukraine.

Last but not least, in an unexpected turn of events, the Russian Ambassador urged Bangladesh and India to de-escalate bilateral tensions on December 22, 2025. Previously, Russia had generally refrained from commenting on Indo–Bangladeshi relations, but the escalation of bilateral tensions between the two states is contrary to Moscow’s economic and strategic interests in South Asia, since it seeks to maintain and expand its ties with both Dhaka and New Delhi. While his comments did not have any immediate effect, it has generated the possibility of Russia acting as a mediator between Bangladesh and India if things go south.

However, during the tenure of the interim government, Russo–Bangladeshi collaboration on defence ties has dwindled. Russian arms exports have plummeted due to heavy attrition on the Ukrainian Front, and fear of Western sanctions has further curbed enthusiasm for the import of Russian weaponry. In fact, due to fear of sanctions, Bangladesh is unable to procure two Mi-171A2 helicopters from Russia despite having already made partial payments. Meanwhile, Bangladesh has imported military equipment from a diverse range of countries, including China, Turkey, and Italy, and is negotiating with Pakistan for the import of Pakistani-manufactured JF-17 Thunder fighter jets.

Conclusion

In brief, despite expectations to the contrary, the trajectory of Russo–Bangladeshi relations in the aftermath of the July Uprising has not changed much. Despite some reservations, both Dhaka and Moscow have pragmatically engaged with each other to continue cooperation in most sectors, including trade, energy, agriculture, and labour migration. The current dynamics of Russo–Bangladeshi relations further substantiate the view that pragmatism, and not ideological or party-specific considerations, would dictate the emerging multipolar world order.

[Md. Himel Rahman is currently serving as Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Gopalganj Science and Technology University. His articles have been published on several platforms, including The Diplomat, The Interpreter, Asia Times, South Asian Voices, The Nation, The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, and New Age.]