The rapid collapse of Venezuela’s air defences during the United States operation to detain Nicolás Maduro exposed less a technological shortfall than a systemic failure rooted in governance, logistics and geopolitical calculation. 

Despite years of investment in advanced Russian-made missile systems, Venezuelan forces entered the crisis with an air defence network that was fragmented, poorly maintained and, in some cases, not operational at all.

According to current and former US officials cited by The New York Times, key elements of Venezuela’s Russian-supplied S-300 and Buk-M2 surface-to-air missile systems were not integrated with radar networks when US aircraft approached Venezuelan airspace. Some components were reportedly still in storage rather than deployed, rendering large sections of the country effectively undefended during the opening phase of the operation.

The radar deficiencies had been reported weeks earlier in an embarrassing episode that laid bare the decay of Venezuela's surveillance infrastructure. In December, Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López was photographed delivering a speech on the country's defence posture with what appeared to be Flightradar24, a consumer flight-tracking website used by aviation enthusiasts, projected behind him. The incident highlighted a critical vulnerability: military aircraft engaged in sensitive operations typically fly with transponders disabled, rendering them invisible to such civilian platforms that rely on publicly broadcast ADS-B signals.

The reliance on consumer-grade tracking tools raised immediate questions among defence analysts about the state of Venezuela's military radar systems, questions that would be answered definitively when US forces encountered virtually no integrated air defence resistance during their January 3 operation.

This outcome sharply contradicted the narrative cultivated by Caracas for more than a decade. Beginning in 2009, under former president Hugo Chávez, Venezuela invested billions of dollars in Russian military hardware, including fighter jets, tanks, long-range air defences and thousands of shoulder-launched missiles. These acquisitions were touted as a strategic shield against US intervention and as evidence of a deep ideological alliance with Moscow.

In practice, though, the systems proved unsustainable. Four current and former senior US officials told the NYT that Venezuelan forces struggled with chronic shortages of spare parts, insufficient technical expertise and degraded command-and-control structures. Years of corruption, sanctions and institutional decay compounded these problems, undermining readiness across the armed forces.

Richard de la Torre, a former CIA station chief in Venezuela, told the newspaper that such conditions would “certainly [have] degraded the readiness of Venezuela’s air defence systems”. He added that Russia also bore responsibility, as Russian technicians and trainers would normally be required to keep such complex systems fully operational.

However, Russia’s own strategic priorities may have limited its involvement. De la Torre and other analysts noted that the Kremlin's military commitments in Ukraine likely reduced its capacity or willingness to sustain Venezuelan systems. Two former US officials went further, suggesting that Russia may have deliberately allowed the equipment to fall into disrepair to avoid escalation with Washington should US aircraft have been downed.

This interpretation aligns with Moscow's broader posture as it seeks to revive dialogue with Washington over Ukraine's nearly four-year war. Fiona Hill, formerly responsible for Russian and European affairs at the US National Security Council, has stated that Russia signalled to Washington it would not contest US dominance in Venezuela in exchange for latitude in Ukraine. Russian officials have also publicly downplayed the strategic importance of Caracas. In November, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov rejected comparisons between Venezuela and Belarus, calling such parallels “inaccurate”.

Operational evidence supports the assessment of Venezuelan unpreparedness. An analysis by the NYT of satellite imagery and social media footage indicates that US strikes focused on sites where Buk systems were stored or partially deployed. In multiple locations, including La Guaira, Catia La Mar and La Carlota Air Base, missile launchers and command vehicles were destroyed while positioned in warehouses or on airfields, rather than actively defending airspace.

The regime's extensive stockpile of Russian-made Igla-S shoulder-launched missiles also played a negligible role. Although Maduro claimed in October that at least 5,000 had been deployed, video evidence reviewed by US officials suggests only limited use, likely deterred by overwhelming US countermeasures.

The episode has broader implications. Brian Naranjo, a former senior US diplomat in Caracas, argued that Russia’s credibility has suffered. “They didn’t show up when Venezuela needed it,” he told the NYT, describing Moscow as having been revealed as a “paper tiger”.

Beyond Venezuela, the failure illustrates the limits of arms sales as a substitute for sustained institutional capacity. Advanced weapons systems require constant maintenance, training and integration. Without them, even the most sophisticated arsenal can prove strategically irrelevant when confronted with a well-prepared adversary.