Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s political survival now rests on a small group of radical and unaffiliated MPs, whose opaque calculations are set to decide the outcome of a no-confidence vote scheduled for May 5.

The governing camp led by the National Liberal Party (PNL) is short by “five or ten” votes needed to block the motion, Bucharest Mayor Ciprian Ciucu said, as cited by HotNews on April 28. Both sides are now openly competing for the support of roughly 64 MPs from fringe parties and breakaway factions, turning them into decisive power brokers.

The initiators of the motion—the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR)—control around 217 votes, or 46.9% of parliament, leaving them about 15 votes short of the threshold required to topple the government. Although 34 of the so-called radical MPs initially signed the motion, the secret ballot means their final vote cannot be taken for granted.

On the other side, Bolojan’s reduced coalition — the PNL, Save Romania Union (USR), the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and minority representatives — can rely on about 182 MPs, or 39.3%, forcing the prime minister to secure support from roughly 50 of the same unpredictable lawmakers.

These MPs, drawn from parties such as SOS Romania and the Party of Young People (POT), have built their profiles on attacking the government but face a clear dilemma: voting it down risks triggering a chain reaction that could lead to early elections — an outcome many are unlikely to survive politically. This raises the prospect of tactical voting or abstentions in a secret ballot.

Expectations in Bucharest still lean towards the motion passing, as the PSD and AUR intensify efforts to secure the remaining votes. If successful, the country enters a volatile phase with no clear governing majority and limited viable coalitions.

If the motion fails, Bolojan would remain in office but stripped of any real governing capacity. A minority cabinet would depend on ad hoc support from the same fringe MPs, making the passage of legislation highly uncertain. Key reforms tied to the disbursement of around €10bn in EU recovery funds would likely stall, while interim ministers would struggle to secure parliamentary confirmation. In this scenario, pressure would shift to President Nicuşor Dan to broker a political reset, most likely by persuading PSD to return to government—an outcome complicated by the party’s current confrontational stance, but the sole functional scenario for keeping the country on the fiscal consolidations' (if not reforms') track.

If the motion passes, the political landscape fragments further. One scenario involves the Liberal Party holding together and refusing cooperation with PSD, which would leave no stable pro-European majority and increase pressure for either a PSD-AUR arrangement or prolonged institutional deadlock. Both options carry significant risks: a PSD-AUR alignment would contradict prior commitments and could isolate Romania politically, while a prolonged deadlock would weaken fiscal oversight and investor confidence.

A second, more likely scenario would see fractures within the PNL, allowing the PSD to rebuild a governing majority with defecting Liberals and potentially USR under pressure from the presidency. Such a coalition could restore formal stability but would likely dilute and delay reforms, particularly those targeting state-owned enterprises and fiscal consolidation. The resulting policy drift could trigger negative reactions from financial markets and complicate Romania’s budget planning beyond 2026.

With formal alliances exhausted, the decision now lies with a group of MPs whose incentives are driven less by ideology than by political survival, making the outcome highly uncertain until the final vote is cast.