On February 12, 2026, the much anticipated 13^th general elections will be held in Bangladesh, amid heightened competition between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), allied with the Twelve-Party Alliance, and the Eleven-Party Alliance led by the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.

The elections are going to be the first truly competitive national elections in Bangladesh since the 2008 general elections, and accordingly it has generated much excitement inside the country, expressed in the form of fierce party-political competition, populist rhetoric, vigorous social media campaigns, and in a few cases, deadly violence. Meanwhile, international actors are closely monitoring the political dynamics in Bangladesh, indicated by the demonstration of an unprecedented level of interest in Bangladeshi domestic politics by media outlets from states such as India, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Bangladeshi elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024 were largely non-competitive owing to the non-participation of principal opposition parties, but the upcoming elections, in which erstwhile political allies BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami are locked in a fierce battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of voters, are expected to be highly competitive. So, the geopolitical implications of the outcome of the elections are uncertain. This is precisely why great, emerging, and regional powers have become highly interested in this election.

Bangladesh’s geopolitical situation after the July Uprising

After the July Uprising of 2024, the foreign policy of Bangladesh witnessed several trends. First, Bangladesh’s previously close political, security, and economic partnership with India has been replaced by non-friendly and rhetoric-driven interactions on the part of both sides, albeit the continuation of compartmentalised cooperation on some issues. Moreover, the interim government initiated a rapprochement with Pakistan and strengthened the existing defence partnership with Turkey, developments which New Delhi views with apprehension.

Also, the change of government in Bangladesh was initially viewed positively by the Biden Administration in the US, but it was offset by the imposition of tariffs on Bangladeshi products by the subsequent Trump Administration, although the tariffs were later reduced upon completion of a bilateral economic deal. On the other hand, both Chinese and Russian media outlets presented the July Uprising as a Western-backed ‘colour revolution’ owing to their cordial ties with the previous Awami League-led government, but both powers quickly moved to strengthen ties with the interim government and the principal political actors in Bangladesh.

Finally, the initiatives of the interim government to facilitate the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees, including the proposed humanitarian corridor to Myanmar’s largely insurgent-controlled Rakhine State, have failed to materialise, and Bangladesh continues to face a host of socio-political, security, and economic challenges in the southeastern direction.

Implications of Bangladesh’s elections

Both of the principal contenders of the upcoming elections – the BNP and the Jamaat – have historically been viewed as anti-Indian in their foreign policy orientations, and backed the building up of close ties with Pakistan, the Muslim World, and China.

Also, President Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the BNP, pursued close partnership with the US, along with anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policies during the Cold War. Similarly, the BNP has lobbied the US against the Awami League-led government and condemned the Russian actions in Ukraine during the late 2010s and early 2020s. Meanwhile, in its internal propaganda materials, the Jamaat has traditionally opposed US and Russian military interventions in Muslim-populated polities, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya.

However, neither of the parties are obstinate about their foreign policy stances, as has been amply demonstrated since the July Uprising. After August 5, 2024, both parties have sought to present themselves as ‘moderate’, and engaged in diplomacy with the US, China, India, and Russia. This has resulted in supposedly ‘strange’ incidents, with the Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Khozin wishing the BNP a ‘successful campaign’ and the US Ambassador Brent Christensen praising the Jamaat for its ‘positive’ role in Bangladesh’s democratic progress. These incidents demonstrate the flexibility and pragmatism of both parties as well as foreign actors.

The electoral manifestos of the two parties can provide an insight into their thinking on foreign and security policies. In the BNP manifesto, the names of great, emerging, and regional powers have been slyly avoided, however, bilateral problems with India, including the sharing of water through trans-boundary rivers, border killings, and push-ins of so-called ‘illegal immigrants’, have been addressed. Also, the manifesto calls for strengthening ties with the Muslim World, particularly the Arab Gulf states, and the rapid resolution of the Rohingya refugee crisis. Moreover, it promises to develop robust four-dimensional armed forces, the promulgation of a national security strategy, and the renaming of the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) back to the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), a populist move.

On the other hand, the Jamaat in its manifesto pledged to maintain good ties with neighbouring states such as India and Myanmar, as well as ‘developed’ states such as the US, the UK, the European Union (EU), Canada, and Japan. Interestingly, its manifesto does not mention China or Russia. Also, it calls for a ‘peaceful’ resolution of the Rohingya crisis. It also promises to develop a national defence policy, promulgate a new military doctrine called Vision 2040, and introduce voluntary military training for youths aged 18–22.

Both the BNP and the Jamaat have carefully refrained from using language in their manifestos which could be viewed as ‘threatening’ by any country. However, the BNP has pledged to resolve bilateral issues with India and Myanmar, such as water sharing, push-in, border killings, and the Rohingya crisis, and if any government pushes these issues, it is likely to generate problems in bilateral relations. Meanwhile, despite the Indian media’s apocalyptic portrayal of the rise of the Islamists in Bangladesh, the Jamaat’s manifesto does not contain any negative reference to India.

However, while manifestos are important indicators of a party’s vision, it should be noted that such documents do not reflect the complete picture.

A projection of the future

Whichever party wins the February 12 elections in Bangladesh, the existing internal and external dynamics indicate that the next government’s foreign policy is likely to demonstrate the following trends:

First, the next government would operate in a much more complex international environment than the previous governments did. The gradual breakdown of the existing post-Second World War international order, the creeping division of the world into ‘spheres of influence’, the greater assertiveness of great, emerging, and regional powers, and the more frequent use of military force in international relations are likely to present the country with unexpected and complicated threats.

Second, for domestic political purposes, the next government is likely to maintain a pro-sovereignty posture vis-à-vis India, which can be interpreted as ’anti-Indian tilt’ in some quarters. Several sensitive issues, including the continued push-in, the dissemination of anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric in India, and the approaching expiration of the Ganges Water Treaty, would create conflict between the two states. However, Dhaka would seek to avoid a complete rupture in its relations with India.

Third, under the next government, Bangladesh is likely to continue its defence partnerships with China and Turkey and to maintain cordial ties with Pakistan. However, the formation of any full-fledged alliance with any of these countries is unlikely, as Dhaka would try to keep its options open.

Fourth, economic realities dictate that the next government would seek the preservation and expansion of economic and trade ties with the Western World, including the US and the EU. At the same time, the growth of populism in both the West and Bangladesh is likely to generate problems, as demonstrated by the recent imposition of visa restrictions by the US on Bangladesh.

Fifth, Bangladesh is likely to maintain economic cooperation with Russia, particularly in the energy, agro-industrial, and labour market sectors. However, Dhaka is unlikely to conclude any major arms deals with Russia in the near future.

Finally, the Rohingya crisis would present a formidable challenge for the next government, as the situation in Rakhine State continues to deteriorate. Like the previous and current governments, the next government would be hard-pressed to find a ‘peaceful’ and durable solution to the Rohingya crisis.

The victor in the Bangladesh elections is likely to confront several challenges in a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous international environment. Accordingly, their reactions to foreign policy issues will have important ramifications for the geopolitics of South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Md. Himel Rahman is currently serving as Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Gopalganj Science and Technology University. His articles have been published on several platforms, including The Diplomat, The Interpreter, Asia Times, South Asian Voices, The Nation, The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, and New Age.