If and when Washington and / or Israel strike Iran in response to the increasing death toll following days of anti-establishment demonstrations – official figures currently put the number around 2,000 - the bombs dropped would send shockwaves far beyond the Middle East. In East and South Asia, where energy security, strategic autonomy and great-power rivalry all come together, a number of governments would be forced into a rapid recalibration, balancing public caution with quiet alignment.

China would move first to condemn any US action against Iran, but would in the current geopolitical climate do so carefully. Beijing has spent two decades cultivating Tehran as a hedge against US influence, securing discounted oil, infrastructure contracts and a geopolitical foothold astride the Gulf. Yet China’s overriding interest is stability, not revolutionary solidarity.

A US or joint US-Israel strike that degraded Iran’s military or nuclear capabilities, particularly if framed as protecting Israel and containing regional escalation, would be privately welcomed in Zhongnanhai - the central leadership compound of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beijing would of course then oppose sanctions expansion – just because - and call for restraint at the UN, but it would also instruct state refiners to quietly diversify supply and avoid becoming collateral damage in a Western crackdown on Iranian oil exports. China’s leadership, wisely, understands that a weakened Iran is a more pliable partner, not a lost one.

India’s response meanwhile would be more openly pragmatic. New Delhi has long walked a tightrope between ties with Tehran and its deepening strategic alignment with Washington and Jerusalem. US / Israeli action against Iran would only accelerate that shift. India’s defence and intelligence relationship with Israel is already foundational, and a decisive blow against Iranian capabilities, especially those threatening Gulf shipping, would likely be seen in India as stabilising, not reckless.

Publicly, India would urge de-escalation and protection of civilians as would most of Asia. Privately, it would use the opportunity to tighten intelligence co-ordination with Israel and the US while ensuring its own much-needed energy imports are insulated through Gulf allies.

Pakistan, however, occupies a more awkward position. It shares a long, and highly porous border with Iran, maintains complex security ties with China, and remains dependent on US financial and diplomatic support. It is also famously anti-India on most fronts. As such, Islamabad would likely issue strong statements opposing intervention, partly for domestic consumption and partly to avoid inflaming sectarian tensions. Yet, Pakistan’s military leadership would have little appetite for siding with Tehran in any wider regional conflagration. Its priority would be border security and preventing Iranian instability from spilling eastward. In the long-term, any weakening of Iran’s regional reach, particularly its disruptive militant proxies, would quietly serve Pakistan’s own security interests.

Elsewhere in Asia, the reaction would be cautious but revealing. Japan and South Korea, both heavily reliant on Middle Eastern energy and closely aligned with Washington, would back US and Israeli action implicitly if not explicitly.

Tokyo, which has long feared disruption to Gulf shipping, would see decisive action as preferable to prolonged brinkmanship. Seoul, facing its own nuclear-armed adversary to the north, would view firm enforcement against Iran as reinforcing global non-proliferation norms; itself a point Israel has long emphasised.

Elsewhere across Asia, the unspoken conclusion would be consistent: Israel’s security concerns are not abstract. Iran’s regional behaviour, missile development and proxy warfare have long destabilised energy markets and trade routes that Asia depends on. To this end, in most capitals, bar perhaps Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta given their Muslim links to Iran, a US intervention that decisively curtails those threats would be criticised in public, but understood in private as restoring a measure of predictability to a volatile region.